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ABSTRACT: In February 2007, two teenage brothers were each sentenced to
ten years in prison for burglary and animal cruelty after they broke into a
community center and killed a puppy by baking it to death in the center's
gas oven.' Just one week earlier, a thirty-year-old mother named Amanda
Hamm was sentenced for helping her boyfriend kill her three young children.
The children drowned after Hamm and her boyfriend intentionally rolled
their car into a lake with the children strapped inside. What sentence did
Hamm receive for the brutal deaths of these three innocent children? Ten
2years in prison.
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1. See D.L. Bennett, 2 Teens Get 10 Years in Tortured Puppy Case, ATLANTAJ.-CONST., Feb. 9,
2007, at lB.
2. See Kevin McDermott, Mother's Sentence in Drownings Sparks Outrage, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Feb. 2, 2007, at Al. This case is a fascinating example of several of the themes
discussed in this Article. Both Hamm and her boyfriend were present during the crime, and
both were charged with first-degree murder. Id. Yet only her boyfriend, who had no biological
relationship to the children, was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in
prison. Id. Hamm, the children's parent, was convicted of child endangerment and received
just a ten-year sentence, rather than the twenty-year sentence that was available to the court and
requested by prosecutors. Id. Because of various sentencing credits, she will ultimately serve
fewer than five years. Id.
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In 2002, approximately sixty-five percent of all murder victims under
the age of thirteen were killed by a family member. Yet these crimes are not
ordinarily the ones that capture public attention; instead, we reserve our
greatest outrage for those relatively rare cases where a child is murdered or
sexually molested by a sexual-predator stranger.4 As a result, we have a
tremendous mismatch between perception and reality: we think we are
tough on crimes committed against children by passing statutes like Megan's
Law, but in practice, we are overlooking the reality that children face the
most danger from family members rather than from strangers. As one
reporter for the Washington Post recently wrote,
People think child homicide is big news, like Adam Walsh or
JonBenet Ramsey[,] . . . but they're wrong. Six or seven infants,
toddlers or children under the age of 10 are killed by adults in the
District [of Columbia] each year, about 1,500 across the country.
Most of them, if they make the news at all, are dispatched with
paragraphs as short as their lives. 5
Equally troubling, these cases often do not result in a perpetrator being held
accountable by the criminal justice system, particularly when that
Cperpetrator is a parent.'
3. See MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE,
FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS 18 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/fvs.pdf. Another government source estimates that 1490 children died as the result of
abuse or neglect in 2004. See ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2004, at xvii (2004), available at
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm04/cmO4.pdf. More than eighty percent of
the children killed were tinder the age of four. Id. Seventy-eight percent of child fatalities due
to abuse, neglect, or both were caused by the child's parent. See id. at 66.
4. See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CHILD VICTIMIZERS: VIOLENT OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 17 (1996), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvvoatv.pdf ("[I]n 1994 over 70% of the murders of
infants were carried out by a family member."); see also PHILIPJENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING
CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLESTER IN MODERN AMERICA 189-214 (1998) (describing America's
increased obsession with sexual predators beginning in the 1990s); Leonore Simon, Sex Offender
Legislation and the Antitherapeutic Effects on Victims, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 485, 487 (1999) ("The fear of
the stranger fuels the majority of criminal legislation, including sex offender laws."). Jenkins
states that "although much evidence suggests that abuse is most likely to occur in the domestic
or neighborhood setting, with family or neighbors as culprits, concepts of the problem place
the blame on outside forces-on fiends and psychopaths, pedophiles and predators." JENKINS,
supra, at 236.
5. Neely Tucker, The Avenger, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2006, at DI.
6. See id. ("[Jurors just don't want to believe that a parent could beat a child to death,
torture him, starve him."); see also Jacy Showers & Julio Apolo, Criminal Dispositions of Persons
Involved in 72 Cases of Fatal Child Abuse, 26 MED. SCI. & L. 243, 246 (1986) ("[lit is relatively
simple for a parent or caretaker to kill a young child without criminal consequences ... ."). In
their study, the authors examined seventy-two child abuse fatalities received at one children's
hospital between 1965 and 1984. Id. at 243. The authors determined that criminal charges were
filed in less than half the cases, and convictions were obtained in only one-third of those cases.
Id. at 244.
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This Article argues that one reason we do not pay sufficient attention to
the reality of violence against children in this country, that we struggle with
holding some parents accountable for the harm they do to their children, is
because of our tendency to romanticize the parent-child relationship. This
romanticization phenomenon has several core components. First, we
continue to believe that love, not law, is sufficient to protect our children,
even in situations where love is clearly not enough. In other words, we
engage in denial; we want to believe that parents will do the right thing by
their children without the intervention of the criminal justice system. As a
result, we tend to focus on therapeutic approaches to address violence
committed against children, without grappling sufficiently with difficult
questions about whether the criminal justice system can also play an
appropriate role. In contrast, reformers working in the spousal-abuse area
have been far more willing to consider utilizing a criminal approach. The
second component is minimization: when violence does occur, we tend to
downplay it. This phenomenon is reflected both in statutes that treat
intrafamilial and extrafamilial offenders differently and in the difficulties
prosecutors face in securing criminal convictions against parents.
Although in recent years scholars have done important work in thinking
about the appropriate contours of the parent-child relationship in the
context of family law,7 scholars have not engaged in as comprehensive a
8project in the field of criminal law. This void is particularly surprising in
light of the tremendous power of the criminal law to shape our moral
judgments and value systems. This Article is an attempt to begin a
conversation about the way children who have been victimized by their
parents are treated by the criminal justice system. I suggest that even though
we are obsessed with our children, that obsession has not translated into
criminal justice policies that adequately protect them. Parental offenders are
systematically treated better by the criminal justice system than are
extrafamilial offenders, and we need to grapple with whether that
pFeferential treatment is appropriate. I suggest that in many instances it is
7. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401
passim (1995) (applying the fiduciary-obligation framework to the parent-child relationship);
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14
CARDOzo L. REV. 1747, 1752 (1993) (reviewing how values necessary for children's welfare are
undermined by our current conception of parental rights).
8. See Tonya Plank, Note, How Would the Criminal Law Treat Sethe?: Reflections on Patriarchy,
Child Abuse, and the Uses of Narrative to Re-Imagine Motherhood, 12 WIS. WOMEN'S LJ. 83, 84 (1997)
(noting the "dearth of scholarly literature analyzing motherhood and crime"); see also Franklin
E. Zimring, Legal Perspectives on Family Violence, 75 CAL. L. REv. 521, 539 (1987) ("The
significance of relationship in the definition and grading of offenses of violence has long been
neglected."). For example, in Martin Guggenheim's recent comprehensive book about
children's rights, he barely mentions the role of the criminal justice system in protecting
children. See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS? 181 (2006)
(noting briefly that prior to the 1970s, the criminal justice system was used to protect children
from harm more often than the foster care system).
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not, and I therefore propose some principles that I hope provide some
guidance for the future formulation of criminal justice policy.
The work that has been done in this area has tended to focus on ways in
which women's victimization of their children may stem from their own
victimization by a patriarchal system that particularly punishes women who
fail to conform to the societal conception of the "good mother."9 These are
important insights to be sure, but I would argue they only begin the inquiry
into the contours of the parent-child relationship within the realm of
criminal law, rather than definitively answer it. At a minimum, for example,
surely the fact that a woman is the victim of domestic violence should be
taken into account when deciding what sentencing options are appropriate.
But what about the child abuse cases where domestic violence is not
involved? One author, for example, has argued that domestic violence and
child abuse overlap in forty to sixty percent of cases.'0 While profoundly
troubling, that statistic also suggests that domestic violence is not present in
forty to sixty percent of cases where children are abused. This Article
suggests that we need to do some hard thinking about parental rights and
responsibilities in those cases as well.
The Article unfolds in five Parts. Part I describes the romanticization
phenomenon, drawing on sources both from law and from popular culture
to demonstrate how we idealize the parent-child bond. As a result, we have
come to believe that we can ordinarily rely upon the strength of that bond,
without messy interference from the criminal justice system, to protect our
children from harm. In other words, the belief that love, not law, is sufficient
to protect our children permeates our approach to family violence.
Part II gives concrete examples of the adverse consequences of this
phenomenon and demonstrates how this phenomenon has harmed
children. I have chosen in this Part to focus on the most serious crimes that
parents can commit against their children: the crimes of murder and rape.
These crimes are the focus of the Article because the conduct at issue
without question can be characterized as criminal; indeed, these crimes
receive our greatest wrath outside the realm of the family. Unfortunately,
the romanticization phenomenon affects the criminal justice system's
treatment of even these most serious of crimes. This Part also includes a
discussion of the parental discipline defense, both because defendants often
raise that issue in child homicide cases and because I believe that our
continued willingness to endorse the use of corporal punishment against
children is contributing to the larger problems discussed in this Article.
9. See Plank, supra note 8, at 92-93 (suggesting that "the actions of women who lash out
against their children" might be viewed "as a struggle against the violence of patriarchal
structures that define their lives").
10. See Bernardine Dohrn, Bad Mothers, Good Mothers, and the State: Children on the Margins,
2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 3-4 (1995) (discussing domestic violence and child abuse as
strong predictors of each other).
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Part III addresses some of the objections raised to using the criminal
justice system more vigorously to protect children from parental violence.
For example, perhaps parental offenders simply are less dangerous than
stranger offenders. Other objections include the idea that we do not need
the incentives of the criminal law to protect children because the fear of
losing a child is incentive enough to induce appropriate parental behavior,
or that parents who have lost a child are suffering enough and the infliction
of additional punishment through the criminal justice system is simply
gratuitous and cruel. This Part also grapples with the very real harms that
greater use of the criminal justice system could potentially create, such as
disruption of families or a disproportionate impact on families of color.
Part V sets forth some principles that hopefully can better guide
policymakers and practitioners in the future as they grapple with how best to
protect our children from harm. This Part argues that if we are serious about
protecting children as a class from physical injury, we must reorient our
thinking about criminal justice policy toward the home, rather than away
from it. This Part also addresses some of the particular issues related to
motherhood and child abuse. Finally, Part V offers some brief concluding
thoughts.
I. AMERICA'S ROMANTICIZATION OF THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP
In the twenty-first century, our obsession with our children, which rose
to a fever pitch in earlier decades,1" has achieved even greater heights.' For
example, the pop-culture media is replete with references to our current
obsession with the well-being of our children. Although these kinds of
sources are anecdotal to be sure and certainly not rigorous empirical
evidence, they nonetheless paint a striking picture. In the recent book The
Overachievers: The Secret Lives of Driven Kids, for example, the author discusses
the phenomenon of "helicopter parents," a "new breed of parents who
hover over their children and swoop in to solve or prevent their problems."
13
11. See PETER N. STEARNS, ANXIOUS PARENTS: A HISTORY OF MODERN CHILDREARING IN
AMERICA 1 (2003) (describing how the twentieth century "became . . . a century of anxiety
about the child and about parents' own adequacy"). Stearns adds that "[c]ontemporary
children [are] seen as more fragile, readily overburdened, requiring careful handling or even
outright favoritism lest their shaky self-esteem be crushed." Id. at 3. Clearly, parents view
themselves as responsible for providing the necessary careful handling.
12. In a recent interview, Stearns stated that "[p]arental overinvolvement has increased
markedly during the past 20 years." Sue Shellenbarger, 'Helicopter Parents'- The Emotional Toll of
Being Too Involved in Your Kid's Life, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2005, at D1 (describing an interview
with Peter Steams). For some historical perspective on society's changing perspective regarding
children, see generally VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING
SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN 3 (1985), which describes "the profound transformation in the
economic and sentimental value of children.., between the 1870s and the 1930s."
13. ALEXANDRA ROBBINS, THE OVERACHIEVERS: THE SECRET LIVES OF DRIVEN KIDS 215-16
(2006).
[2007]
LADY MADONNA, CHILDREN AT YOUR FEET
In The Price of Privilege, psychologist Madeline Levine describes the "anxious,
overprotective, oversolicitous, intrusive parenting that has become
commonplace in affluent communities."'4 Indeed, today's "anxious parents
are hyperattentive to their kids, reactive to every blip of their child's day,
eager to solve every problem for their child-and believe that's good
parenting."' Further, this obsession is both individualized, in that parents
are more invested in their own children than ever before, and generalized,
in that as a society, we are increasingly preoccupied with children. One only
has to look at the number of magazine covers at a newsstand screaming
about the latest celebrity "baby bump," or the number of books about
parenting on the shelf at the local bookstore, to know that children are a hot
topic right now.
6
There are doubtless a number of reasons for this obsession with our
children. For one thing, families simply are smaller now than in the past,
giving parents more time to focus attention on individual children.'7 More
fundamentally, in a world of plane hijackings and anthrax attacks, parents
perceive the world as a very frightening place, one from which they need to
protect children." Further, in a world of high divorce rates in the personal
sphere and layoffs, downsizing, and rising bankruptcies in the business
sphere, external success in our adult lives seems more elusive than ever
before." Thus, our children become one concrete measure of our success;
14. MADELINE LEVINE, THE PRICE OF PRIVILEGE: How PARENTAL PRESSURE AND MATERIAL
ADVANTAGE ARE CREATING A GENERATION OF DISCONNECTED AND UNHAPPY KIDS 74 (2006).
Levine adds that "[i]n a maddening paradox, the media, often aided by 'experts,' idealizes
motherhood while it devalues actual mothers. We are regularly scolded and chastised and
warned that our smallest mistakes can have negative lifetime consequences for our children."
Id. at 202.
15. Hara Estroff Marano, A Nation of Wimps, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 64.
16. See, e.g., The Borzoi Reader, Author Q&A: A Conversation with Ann Hulbert, http://
www.randomhouse.com/knopf/catalog/display.pperl?isbn=9780375701221 &view-qa (last
visited Sept. 28, 2007) (stating that there "are five times more parenting books published now
than in 1970"). Hulbert is the author of RAISING AMERICA: EXPERTS, PARENTS, AND A CENTURY OF
ADVICE ABOUT CHILDREN (2003).
17. See Sandra G. Boodman, Sick of Expectations: Pressure to Compete, Not Connect, Leaves Many
Affluent Teens Miserable, Says a Psychologist and Author, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2006, at F1
(describing an interview with psychologist Madeline Levine).
18. See generally JOEL BEST, THREATENED CHILDREN 87-130 (1990) (describing how the
mass media and popular culture can hype up fears about threats to children).
19. See generally Nancy Gibbs et al., Parents Behaving Badly, TIME, Feb. 21, 2005. Gibbs
describes:
Given these unsettled times, if parents feel less in control of their own lives, they
try to control what they can, which means everything from swooping down at the
first bad grade to demanding a good 12 inches of squishy rubber under thejungle
gym so that anyone who falls will bounce right back.
Id. at 42; see also Boodman, supra note 17 (reporting psychologist Madeline Levine's statements
that "a lot of women feel that their best emotional bet is their children" because "[tihe divorce
rate is high, friendships are hard to come by, [and] communities are competitive"); Steven
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indeed, we perceive our children as reflections of ourselves. As one
commentator has suggested, "The process of child 'development' has
become more about the parent than the child."
21
We are equally obsessed with the notion that parents bear unique
responsibility for a child's well-being. "Americans were distinctive, by mid-
century, in their willingness to attribute personal problems to parental
mishandling."21 While parents certainly have significant responsibilities and
opportunities in terms of shaping their children's behavior, we find it
difficult to accept the notion that there are some aspects of our children's
lives that we simply cannot control. We cannot always protect them from
life's misfortunes or even ensure that they will grow up to be happy and
responsible adults. Therefore, parents become particularly controlling over
those aspects of their children's lives that they can in fact influence.
Of course, this idealization of the parent-child relationship, while
perhaps now at its greatest intensity, is not just of recent vintage or limited to
22popular culture. It would also be an overstatement to assert that we have
21
always idealized this relationship with equal fervor for all family groupings.
Mintz, How We All Became Jewish Mothers, NAT'L POST (Toronto), Feb. 17, 2006, at A18 ("As
marriage bonds have grown more fragile, parents invest more of their time, emotion, energy
and resources into their kids.").
20. ROBBINS, supra note 13, at 217. Robbins adds that "several experts have argued that
parenting has become this country's most competitive sport." Id. at 217-18; see also ANN
HULBERT, RAISING AMERICA: EXPERTS, PARENTS, AND A CENTURY OF ADVICE ABOUT CHILDREN 4
(2003) (discussing Americans' "fixation" with and "cultural anxiety" about the raising of
children); Mintz, supra note 19 ("Today's society is child-obsessed. But whether contemporary
society is child-friendly is another matter.").
21. STEARNS, supra note 11, at 54. Steams cites, as an example, adults who struggle with
obesity or anger-management issues. See id. If you are too fat, that's because your parents both
failed to guide your food choices and left you with insecurities for which you use food to
compensate. Id. If "you have problems with anger at work," "[s]omehow, your parents did not
help you learn to identify and control a dangerous emotion." Id.
22. SeeJudith G. McMullen, Privacy, Family Autonomy, and the Maltreated Child, 75 MARQ. L.
REV. 569, 592 (1992) (discussing our "deeply ingrained" "presumption that parents will usually
act in the best interests of their children"). McMullen cites all the way back to William
Blackstone for this proposition, arguing that "Blackstone noted that Providence had enforced
parental duties more effectively than could laws 'by implanting in the breast of every parent that
natural ... or insuperable degree of affection, which not even the wickedness, ingratitude, and
rebellion of children, can totally suppress or extinguish.'" Id. at 593 (alteration in original)
(quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *435); see also Ira C. Lupu, The Separation of
Powers and the Protection of Children, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1317, 1323 & n.16 (1994) ("[T]he Framers
themselves likely subscribed to the late-eighteenth-century view that family members shared a
natural loyalty and affection . . . ."). For a description of the history of child protection efforts in
America, see generally JOHN E.B. MYERS, CHILD PROTECTION IN AMERICA: PAST, PRESENT AND
FUTURE 11-103 (2006), and Mason P. Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect Part I. Historical
Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REV. 293 (1972).
23. For example, historically-and deplorably-the legal system has been far more
protective of, and more likely to idealize, the parent-child relationship in white families than in
families of color. See discussion infra Part III.B.2. Society has also been more protective of
parent-child relationships in heterosexual families than same-sex families. See, e.g., D. KELLY
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But in general, this country has long emphasized the importance of
protecting the autonomy and privacy of the family against state interference,
in part because of the perception that a family did not need the state's
intervention to ensure the protection of its individual members; love would
do that instead.24 The Supreme Court's jurisprudence has certainly reflected
this tradition, as exemplified by this oft-repeated refrain: "[The law's
concept of the family] . . .historically ... has recognized that natural bonds
of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.'
Indeed, it seems the Court relied in part on its belief in the importance and
strength of the parent-child bond when concluding that the state has
limited constitutional obligations, at best, with regard to protecting its
citizens from "private" violence. 6
This emphasis on the "natural bonds of affection" to protect our
children has had an unfortunate result: we have not grappled sufficiently
with the question of whether the criminal justice system can and should play
WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 743-50 (3d
ed. 2006) (describing the impact that sexual orientation can have on child-custody decisions).
24. See, e.g., ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY 8 (1987). Pleck writes:
By the 1830s the private sphere came to acquire a deeply emotional texture; it
became a refuge from the hard, calculating dealings of the business world.
Relations between family members were seen as qualitatively different-more
affectionate, lasting, and binding than those between strangers. Nothing was more
sacred and socially useful than mother love-it made children righteous and
responsible.
Id. Of course, there are other pernicious facets to this longstanding emphasis on protecting the
privacy of the family unit. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, in THE PUBLIC
NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 36, 39 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds.,
1994) ("The rhetoric of privacy . . . devalues women and their functions, and says that women
are not important enough to merit legal regulation." (citation omitted)); Reva Siegel, Why Equal
Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1111, 1118 (1997) ("By the turn of the century, courts seeking to justify wives' continuing legal
disabilities described marriage as an emotional relationship subsisting in a private realm
'beyond' the reach of law....").
25. Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68
(2000) (quoting Parham, 442 U.S. at 602); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983) ("The
intangible fibers that connect parent and child have infinite variety. They are woven
throughout the fabric of our society, providing it with strength, beauty, and flexibility.");
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) ("The history and culture of Western civilization
reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their
children."); Thomas, supra note 22, at 293 ("Our laws and legal systems have developed over
hundreds of years around the expectation that parents will love and protect.").
26. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989)
(holding that the state has no obligation under the Due Process Clause to protect a child from
violence inflicted by his father, even though the state was aware that the child was being
abused). Chief Justice Rehnquist felt compelled to point out that if the state functionaries had
acted too quickly in taking steps to protectJoshua by removing him from his father's care, "they
would likely have been met with charges of improperly intruding into the parent-child
relationship." Id. at 203.
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an important role in protecting children. Consider, for example, the
development of one of the most important legal institutions affecting the
27family this century, the juvenile and family courts. Critically, reformers
structured these courts around the beliefs that the criminal justice system
was ill-equipped to handle the problems of family violence and that a
therapeutic approach addressed such problems better than a criminal one.28
Indeed, the reformers behind the creation of these courts believed that the
criminal justice system actually could do affirmative harm because it could
lead to the breakup of a family, rather than the strengthening of it. 29 As a
result, these courts primarily were devoted to preserving the family unit °
and were intended to "offer a curative rather than punitive approach to
family problems."
30
Even the explosion of interest in child abuse during the early 1960s in
some ways reflects the romanticization phenomenon. In 1962, the Journal of
the American Medical Association published an enormously influential article
entitled The Battered Child Syndrome, which eventually led members of the
27. See, e.g., ELLEN GRAY, UNEQUALJUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 10
(2003). Gray describes how child abuse cases, including both physical-abuse and neglect cases,
became "decriminalized," with all "family problems . . . thought amenable to benevolent
intervention." Id. Gray suggests that "it is through this less formal judicial system, not the
criminal system, that most physical abuse cases [and] virtually all neglect cases . . . that are
brought to any kind ofjustice system are taken, even to this day." Id.
28. As Elizabeth Pleck has written, "The juvenile and family courts founded in the early
twentieth century ... regarded domestic violence as a family problem, not a violation of the
criminal law." PLECK, supra note 24, at 11. This same trend is evident in one of the nineteenth-
century precursors to family courts, the rapid rise of societies dedicated to the protection of
children from cruelty. As Pleck notes, "[T]he law enforcement rhetoric of the [societies] was
considerably stronger than their actions. They rarely prosecuted parents for child cruelty ....
[T]heir actual work . . . was primarily threatening and cajoling neglectful, often drunken
parents and occasionally removing their children from them." Id. at 70. Pleck adds that "the
child cruelty societies operated in a manner similar to the police-they carried a big stick, but
rarely used it." Id. at 85.
29. See GRAY, supra note 27, at 10 ("[Rlesorting to the criminal courts could only
stigmatize emotionally ill parents, break up families, and cause economic hardship.").
30. Elizabeth Bartholet suggests that although family-preservation policies are increasingly
the subject of debate, they still remain a vital goal in "the mindset of most of those who make
and implement child welfare policy," including judges, social workers, and lawyers. ELIZABETH
BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN 122 (1999); see also id. at 113-59 (explaining in detail how
traditional family-preservation policies continue to flourish).
31. PLECK, supra note 24, at 126. One of Pleck's more interesting observations is that
"judges who favored the establishment of family courts argued that relatives who committed
crimes against each other ought not to be punished as common criminals, since they were
merely ignorant, mentally deficient, or perhaps lazy and shiftless." Id. To this day, we persist in
viewing a parent's criminal acts committed against a child as an aberration or as a manifestation
of some psychological malady, rather than a criminal act. Further, the Progressive reformers
who helped found these courts also subscribed to a belief in the power of parental love. As
Pleck has written, "Where the previous generations had rebuked depraved parents, the
Progressive reformers tried to see behind domestic rage to the 'natural affection' between
mothers and their children." Id. at 127.
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medical and legal communities to devote increasing amounts of time and
resources to the problem of child abuse: Elizabeth Pleck has made some
fascinating observations about the impact of this article and the reform
efforts it spurred. She wrote:
The medical definition of child abuse . . .provided more humane
treatment for the parent than the view of child abuse as a sin or
crime. It implied the assailant was not a criminal, but someone
unable to control his or her behavior. ... Classifying child battery
as a syndrome also increased public compassion .... Most social
workers, doctors, and even many lawyers and judges agreed that
imprisoning abusive parents-other than those who had murdered
their children-was counterproductive. Police and judges were not
• 33
qualified to handle family problems.
Thus, the focus needed to be on "curing" abusive parents, rather than
condemning them, and preservation of an intact family unit remained an
• 34
objective of paramount importance.
There is a striking contrast in this regard between the development of
our approach to crimes committed against women versus crimes committed
against children. Efforts to protect children from family violence primarily
have emphasized a therapeutic approach, while efforts to curb violence
against women have been far more likely in recent years to emphasize a
criminal approach.3 5 Elizabeth Pleck succinctly captured the difference:
32. See generally C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 19 (1962).
Numerous commentators have pointed to the publication of this article as the seminal event
that triggered increased interest in the problem of child abuse. See, e.g., Lloyd Ohlin & Michael
Tonry, Family Violence in Perspective, in FAMILY VIOLENCE 1, 1 (Lloyd Ohlin & Michael Tonry eds.,
1989).
33. PLECK, supra note 24, at 172-73.
34. Numerous academic commentators endorsed this kind of approach to child abuse in
the years following the ptblication of Kempe's article. See, e.g., Michael Wald, State Intervention
on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985, 1027 (1975)
(arguing that "criminal penalties for sexual abuse by parents or other family members should
be eliminated," in part because "criminal prosecution will often result in the father's
imprisonment" and "[s]everal recent reports contend that splitting up the family and
imprisoning the father may add to the child's problems"); Lloyd Leva Plaine, Comment,
Evidentiary Problems in Criminal Child Abuse Prosecutions, 63 GEO. L.J. 257, 259 n.12 (1974)
("Removing the cause of the abuse and strengthening the family rather than punishing the
abuser would seem better to serve the end of helping both the child and the perpetrator."); see
also PLECK, supra note 24, at 202 ("Programs since the 1960s have been more concerned about
ensuring the physical safety of victims than ones earlier in this century, but nonetheless still
cling to the belief that the family, after undergoing some sort of treatment, can and should be
restored."). For a more recent example of this viewpoint, see Roger J. R. Levesque, Prosecuting
Sex Crimes Against Children: Time for "Outrageous" Proposals, 19 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 59, 62
(1995), which suggests that "criminalization efforts are essentially misguided."
35. Of course, every state has statutes criminalizing some forms of child abuse and neglect,
although some of these statutes have problematic features, as Part 11 discusses. The primary
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While reformers against child abuse opposed criminal sanctions
against perpetrators, reformers against wife abuse and marital rape
favored them and tried to pressure the police and courts to
respond adequately to the complaints of women victims. The
medical and social work professionals who dominated child abuse
reform defined child battering as a psychological illness of the
parents requiring social services and psychological treatment. The
feminist activists and lawyers who led the campaign against wife
beating and marital rape rooted the problem in the inequality of
women and the lack of proper law enforcement.
38
What can account for this difference in approach?3v First, our belief in
381parental love is far more unshakeable than our belief in marital love. We
are used to bitter divorces and the notion that romantic love can end, but we
are convinced parental love endures and transcends all other relationships.
Second, we persist in viewing our children as our personal property,
although we have largely moved beyond that phenomenon when it comes to
women.3 9 We want to be in a world where parents, not the state, have the
right to control and direct their children. Third, we view spousal abusers as
more dangerous than child abusers. We believe there are no externalities
when it comes to child abuse-that an abusive parent poses no danger to
anyone outside the home. Abusive partners, on the other hand, easily can
move onto other partners and are perceived as more willing to use violence
generally.
Feminist scholars previously have offered insights about the way we
idealize the institution of motherhood. Jane Murphy, for example, has
argued that "[t] he stereotype [family, welfare, and criminal] laws embody is
that of a self-sacrificing, nurturing, married, and stay-at-home mother."
40
disparities in the way we treat crimes against women versus crimes against children, however,
arise in enforcement patterns and priorities.
36. Elizabeth Pleck, Criminal Approaches to Family Violence, 1640-1980, in FAMILY VIOLENCE,
supra note 32, at 19, 49-50; see also Douglas J. Besharov, 'Doing Something' About Child Abuse: The
Need to Narrow the Grounds for State Intervention, 8 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 540, 553 (1985) ("Most
Americans believe that child maltreatment is primarily a social and psychological ill and that
treatment and rehabilitation, not punishment and retribution, are the best means of protecting
endangered children.").
37. 1 am indebted to Mario Barnes for some of the insights in this paragraph.
38. See generally Marsha Garrison, Autonomy or Community? An Evaluation of Two Models of
Parental Obligation, 86 CAL. L. REV. 41, 73 (1998) ("[Flamily relationships are governed by
altruism rather than by the constraints of formal justice. Although this tendency has abated in
contemporary discussions of marriage, it is still dominant in discussions of the parent-child tie."
(footnotes omitted)).
39. See, e.g., BARTHOLET, supra note 30, at 7 (suggesting that most people, across the
political spectrum, "share a deep sense that children belong with and to their biological
parents" (emphasis added)).
40. Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare "Reform,"
Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688, 690 (1988).
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Dorothy Roberts has argued that our legal system not only "reinforces the
image of mother as a selfless being,"4' but it also allows both racial and class
stereotypes to influence our definition of the ideal mother. 2 It is impossible
to talk about parenthood and crime without giving special attention to the
issue of motherhood, and this Article, therefore, discusses some issues
related to mothering in Part IV.
However, this Article suggests that an equally important-and
overlooked-point is that we idealize not only the institution of
motherhood, but also the parent-child relationship, such that we believe we
can rely on natural bonds of "loyalty and affection" to protect children
43without having to resort to the criminal justice system. Of course, in many
cases, the bonds of love and affection are enough to keep parents from
resorting to violence, even when buckling under the enormous stresses and
demands that accompany parenthood. But even in cases where a crime has
been committed and, thus, those bonds clearly are not enough, this Article
suggests that the criminal justice system tends to give preferential treatment
to crimes committed by parents as compared to crimes committed by
strangers and asks whether that disparity in treatment is justified. The next
Part turns to some concrete examples of this phenomenon.
II. EXAMPLES OF THE IMPACT OF THE ROMANTICIZATION PHENOMENON ON
THE CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM
The first Part of this Article described how the romanticization
phenomenon influenced the early development of the criminal justice
system's response to violence committed against children by their parents.
This Part suggests that the phenomenon remains vital today by describing
some of the consequences that the romanticization phenomenon has
44created within the criminal justice system. These examples are not
41. Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IOwA L. REv. 95, 103 (1993).
42. See id. at 105 ("[S]ocietal concepts of race and class determine the meaning of
maternal selflessness.").
43. Lupu, supra note 22, at 1323; see also Garrison, supra note 38, at 73 (discussing the
"tendency to assume that family relationships are governed by altruism rather than by the
constraints of formal justice," especially in relation to the "parent-child tie").
44. Another example of how the romanticization phenomenon remains vital today can be
found in the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, for example, the Supreme Court struck down a statutory provision
requiring women to notify their spouses of their intentions before they could obtain an
abortion, in large part because the Court recognized that many marriages involve serious
physical and psychological abuse. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 888-
98 (1992) (discussing the issue of domestic abuse). In the very same opinion, however, the
Court upheld a parental consent requirement without discussing at all the potential for
violence in the parent-child relationship. See id. at 899. Indeed, the Court's abortion
,jurisprudence tends to describe the parent-child relationship in glowing terms. See, e.g., Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 649 (1979) (stating that "both the father and mother have an interest-
one normally supportive-in helping to determine the course that is in the best interests of a
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necessarily exhaustive, but I believe they powerfully demonstrate that we
need to think more critically about the way that the criminal justice system
addresses parenthood. I have chosen here to focus on conduct that results in
the death of a child or involves sexual abuse because we view murder and
rape as the most reprehensible crimes that one human being can commit
against another. Even in the context of these most serious crimes, the
criminal justice system generally treats parents who victimize their own
children better than strangers who victimize children. This Part begins with
sexual abuse, where the criminal statutes of many states continue to provide
the option of giving preferential treatment to parental offenders. It then
turns to homicide cases and the related issue of the parental discipline
defense.4 5
A. PREFlENTIAL TREA TMENT FOR SEXUAL ABUSERS WHO VICTIMIZE
FAMILY MEMBERS
One of the most striking ways in which our romanticization of the
parent-child relationship victimizes children is the treatment of sexual
abuse committed against children by family members. We persist in viewing
intrafamilial sexual abuse as less noteworthy and, indeed, as less
blameworthy than sexual abuse perpetrated by strangers.46 This preferential
treatment is evident in two separate ways: first, in the statutory schemes that
address child sexual abuse and, second, in the prosecution and conviction
rates for intrafamilial sex offenders.
daughter"); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 (1976) (Stewart,J.,
concurring) (stating that abortion is a "grave decision, and a girl of tender years, under
emotional stress, may be ill-equipped to make it without mature advice and emotional support"
from her parents). In its most recent description of the parent-child bond in an abortion
opinion, the Court pronounced that "[riespect for human life finds an ultimate expression in
the bond of love the mother has for her child." See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634
(2007).
45. For a discussion of how the criminal justice system also privileges family relationships
in other contexts, see generally Dan Markel, Jennifer Collins & Ethan Leib, CriminalJustice and
the Challenge of Family Ties, 2007 ILL. L. REv. 1147.
46. Indeed, we are reluctant to confront the horror of child sexual abuse at all. As Lynne
Henderson has written, "Awareness of the existence of sexual abuse of children is too painful
and too threatening to encounter unmediated; hence, fully understandable responses include
shrinking away from thinking about it, explaining it away, or flatly denying its existence." Lynne
Henderson, Without Narrative: Child Sexual Abuse, 4 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 479, 481 (1997).
Elizabeth Schneider makes a comparable point about the phenomenon of wife battering,
arguing that we as a society need "denial." Schneider argues that we "affirm it as a problem that
is individual, that only involves a particular male-female relationship, and for which there is no
social responsibility to remedy." Elizabeth Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REv.
973,983 (1991).
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1. Statutory Disparities
The statutory schemes employed by various states to address the
problem of intrafamilial sex abuse are truly remarkable. Because of
legislation like Megan's Law,47 we have a perception that state and federal
statutes are tough on sex offenders who victimize children, but that
statement is far more true for sex offenders who victimize strangers than for
sex offenders who select their victims from within the family. This Section
focuses on three striking examples of these statutory disparities: the incest
loopholes, the sentencing loopholes, and the sex-offender-registration
loopholes.4 8
Let us begin with the incest and sentencing loopholes. All states
criminalize sexual offenses committed against children. However, if the
offender is a family member, many states allow the prosecutor to file charges
under an incest statute, rather than under a general rape or sexual abuse
statute. As evidenced by the statutory schemes described below, incest
convictions typically carry far less significant penalties.49 In Alabama, for
example, a defendant convicted of rape in the first degree, which includes
an adult engaging in sexual intercourse with a child who is under the age of
twelve, is guilty of a Class A felony and faces a mandatory sentence of at least
ten years and possibly life in prison.50 If the offender engages in sexual
intercourse with a young family member, on the other hand, the prosecutor
can elect to file charges under Alabama's incest statute instead, which is only
47. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
48. At least this issue is beginning to permeate the public consciousness; it was recently
the subject of a prominent feature article in 0, The Oprah Magazine's November 2006 issue. See
Jan Goodwin, Please Daddy, No, 0 OPRAH MAG., Nov. 2006, at 320. 1 am also indebted to
PROTECT, an advocacy organization, for some of the information that follows; they have a very
useful web site addressing these issues. See Nat'l Ass'n to Protect Children, http://www.
protect.org (last visited Sept. 29, 2007).
49. One recent and very detailed article used the State of California as an illustration of
this problem. See Ruby Andrew, Child Sexual Abuse and the State: Applying Critical Outsider
Methodologies to Legislative Policymaking, 39 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1851, 1870 (2006). For example,
an individual convicted in California of "lewd acts involving children" faced a mandatory jail
sentence of at least three years. Id. If the victim and defendant were related, however, the
prosecutor could elect to file an incest charge instead, which would carry no mandatory
sentence of incarceration. Id. at 1871. Further, defendants charged with sexual abuse who were
not related to their victims were statutorily forbidden from receiving a sentence of probation,
but the California legislature specifically exempted offenders who are the victim's "natural
parent, adoptive parent, stepparent, relative, or ... a member of the victim's household" from
this prohibition. Id. at 172. Although California recently closed these loopholes in response to
ferocious lobbying efforts, the article is still a very worthwhile read. For a description of the
successful effort to close California's loophole, see the discussion at Nat'l Ass'n to Protect
Children, PROTECT California Campaign, http://protect.org/california/caCOTCampaign.
shtml (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
50. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61 (2005) (defining first-degree rape).
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a Class C felony carrying a mandatory sentence of just a year and a day.5'
Similarly, in Delaware, a defendant can be guilty of rape in the first degree, a
Class A felony, if he engages in intercourse with a child under the age of
52twelve. If the child is a family member, however, the defendant can be
53charged with incest, which is only a Class A misdemeanor. In Delaware, a
Class A felony carries a mandatory sentence of at least fifteen years and up to
life imprisonment, while a Class A misdemeanor carries no mandatory jail
time at all, and the maximum sentence of imprisonment can only be one
year.54 In all, at least twenty-six states retain some preferential treatment for
incest offenders as compared to other sexual offenders: Alabama,55
Delaware, 56 Florida,5 7 Hawaii, 5s Indiana, 59 Iowa,6 ° Louisiana,
6
' Maine, 62
51. See id. § 13A-13-3 (defining incest); see also id. § 13A-5-6 (providing mandatory
sentences ). Alabama's incest provision does not include any limitations on the basis of age, so it
can apply to sexual contact between a parent and young child or between two consenting
adults.
52. See DEL. CODEANN. tit. 11, § 773 (2005) (defining first-degree rape).
53. See id. § 766 (defining incest).
54. Compare id. § 4205 (providing sentences for felonies), with id. § 4206 (providing
sentences for misdemeanors).
55. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
57. See FLA. STAT. § 800.04(5) (b) (2006) (defining lewd or lascivious molestation against a
victim under age twelve by an individual of age eighteen or older as a life felony); id. § 826.04
(defining incest as a third-degree felony); see also id. § 775.082(3) (a), (d) (providing that life
felonies carry a maximum life sentence and that third-degree felonies carry a maximum five-
year sentence).
58. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-730 (Supp. 2006) (defining sex with a victim under age
fourteen, or a victim age fifteen or sixteen if the offender is five years or more older, as a Class
A felony); id. § 707-741 (1993) (defining incest as a Class C felony); see also id. § 706-659
(providing that Class A felonies carry a twenty-year sentence); id. § 706-660 (providing that Class
C felonies carry a maximum five-year sentence).
59. See IND. CODE § 35-42-4-3(a), (a)(1) (1998) (defining sex with a victim under age
fourteen as a Class B felony or, if the offender is age twenty-one or older, a Class A felony); id. §
35-46-1-3(a) (defining incest as a Class C felony or, if the other individual is under age sixteen, a
Class B felony); id. § 35-50-2-4 (providing that Class A felonies carry a minimum twenty-year
sentence and a maximum fifty-year sentence); id. § 35-50-2-5 (providing that Class B felonies
carry a minimum six-year sentence and a maximum twenty-year sentence); id. § 35-50-2-6
(providing that Class C felonies carry a minimum two-year sentence and a maximum eight-year
sentence).
60. See IOWA CODE § 709.3 (2007) (defining sex with a victim under age twelve as a Class B
felony); id. § 726.2 (defining incest as a Class D felony); id. § 902.9 (providing that Class B
felonies carry a maximum twenty-five-year sentence, while Class D felonies carry a maximum
five-year sentence).
61. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:42D(2) (2007) (providing that sex with a victim under age
thirteen carries a sentence of either life imprisonment or death); id. § 14:78D(1) (2007)
(providing that incest involving a descendant carries a maximum fifteen-year sentence).
62. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 253 (2006) (defining sex with a victim under age
twelve as a Class A crime); id. § 556(1) (A) (defining first offense for incest as a Class D crime);
id. § 1252 (2)(A), (D) (providing that Class A crimes carry a maximum thirty-year sentence,
while Class D crimes carry a maximum one-year sentence)
[2007]
LADY MADONNA, CHILDREN AT YOUR FEET
63 t4 65 '66 '67 68Maryland, Massachusetts, 4 Minnesota, Missouri Nebraska Nevada,
New Mexico, 69  North Dakota,7 0  Oklahoma,71  Pennsylvania, 2  South
79 74 75 76, 77 781Carolina,73 Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
63. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAw § 3-303(c), (d) (4) (West Supp. 2007) (providing that
rape of a victim under age thirteen by an individual age eighteen or older carries a minimum
twenty-five-year sentence and a maximum life sentence); id. § 3-323 (2002) (providing that
incest carries a minimum one-year sentence and a maximum ten-year sentence).
64. See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 265, § 23 (2006) (providing that unlawful sex with and abuse
of a victim under age sixteen carries a maximum life sentence); id. at ch. 272, § 17 (providing
that incest carries a maximum twenty-year sentence).
65. See MINN. STAT. § 609.342 (Supp. 2006) (providing that sex between a victim under
age thirteen and an individual more than the thirty-six months older than the victim carries a
maximum thirty-year sentence and a presumptive twelve-year sentence); id. § 609.365
(providing that incest carries a maximum ten-year sentence).
66. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.032 (Supp. 2006) (providing that sex with a victim under age
fourteen carries a minimum five-year sentence and a maximum life sentence); id. § 568.020
(defining incest is a Class D felony); see also id. § 558.011(4) (providing that Class D felonies
carry a maximum four-year sentence).
67. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319.01 (Supp. 2006) (providing that sex between a victim
under age twelve and an individual age nineteen or older is a Class IB felony with minimum
fifteen-year sentence for a first offense); id. § 28-703 (1995) (defining incest as a Class Ill
felony); see also id. § 28-105 (Supp. 2006) (providing that Class IB felonies carry a maximum life
sentence, while Class III felonies carry a minimum one-year sentence and a maximum twenty-
year sentence).
68. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.366(3) (c) (2006) (providing that sexual assault of a victim
under age fourteen carries a life sentence for a first offense); id. § 201.180 (providing that
incest carries a minimum two-year sentence and a maximum life sentence).
69. See N.M. STAT. § 30-9-11(c)(1) (2004) (defining a sex act with a victim under age
thirteen as a first-degree felony); id. § 30-10-3 (defining incest as a third-degree felony); id. § 31-
18-15 (providing that first-degree felonies carry a basic eighteen-year sentence, while third-
degree felonies for a sexual offense against a child carry a basic six-year sentence).
70. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03 (Supp. 2007) (defining a sex act with a victim under
age fifteen by an individual more than five years older than the victim as a Class AA felony); id.
§ 12.1-20-11 (defining incest as a Class C felony); id. § 12.1-32-01 (providing that Class AA
felonies carry a maximum life sentence, while Class C felonies carry a maximum five-year
sentence).
71. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1114 (2001) (defining rape committed upon a victim under
age fourteen by an individual over age eighteen as first-degree rape); id. § 1115 (Supp. 2006)
(providing that first-degree rape carries a minimum five-year sentence and a maximum
sentence of death); id. § 885 (2001) (providing that incest carries a maximum ten-year
sentence).
72. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3121(c) (2002) (defining sex with a victim under age thirteen
as a first-degree felony); id. § 4302 (defining incest as a second-degree felony); see also id. §
1103(1)-(2) (providing that first-degree felonies carry a maximum twenty-year sentence;
second-degree felonies carry a maximum ten-year sentence).
73. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655 (2006) (providing that sexual battery of a victim under
age eleven carries a minimum twenty-five-year sentence); id. § 16-15-20 (1976) (providing that
incest carries minimum one-year sentence).
74. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-522, -531 (2006) (defining sex with a victim under age
thirteen as a Class A felony); id. § 39-15-302 (defining incest as a Class C felony); id. § 40-35-111
(providing that Class A felonies carry a minimum fifteen-year sentence and a maximum sixty-
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Wisconsin, 79 and Wyoming.8° A number of other states have eliminated their
exemptions only in the past year or so."'
Prosecutors can, of course, avoid the impact of these statutory
disparities if they choose to file charges under a rape statute rather than
under an incest statute. However, the discretion typically afforded
prosecutors in their charging decisions means that they are not compelled
to do so. Moreover, the very existence of these disparate statutory schemes
sends a powerful normative message: sexual abuse of a family member is a
year sentence, while Class C felonies carry a minimum three-year sentence and a maximum
fifteen-year sentence).
75. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11 (Vernon 2003) (defining sexual contact with a
victim under age seventeen as a second-degree felony); id. § 25.02 (Supp. 2006) (defining incest
with a descendant as a third-degree felony); id. § 12.33 (Vernon 2003) (providing that second-
degree felonies carry a minimum two-year sentence and a maximum twenty-year sentence); id. §
12.34 (providing that third-degree felonies carry a minimum two-year sentence and a maximum
ten-year sentence).
76. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (Supp. 2007) (providing that sex with a victim under age
thirteen carries a minimum five-year sentence and a maximum life sentence); id. § 18.2-366
(2004) (defining incest with a descendant as a Class 5 felony); see also id. § 18.2-10 (Supp. 2007)
(providing that Class 5 felonies carry a minimum one-year sentence and a maximum ten-year
sentence).
77. See WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.44.073 (2005) (defining sex with a victim under age twelve
by an individual at least twenty-four months older than the victim as a Class A felony);, id. §
9A.64.020 (defining incest with a descendant as a Class B felony); see also id. § 9A.20.021
(providing that Class A felonies carry a maximum life sentence, while Class B felonies carry a
maximum ten-year sentence).
78. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-7 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007) (providing that sexual
contact with a victim under age twelve by an individual age eighteen or older carries a
minimum five-year sentence and a maximum twenty-five-year sentence); id. § 61-8-12 (2005)
(providing that incest carries a minimum five-year sentence and a maximum fifteen-year
sentence).
79. See Wis. STAT. § 948.02 (2006) (defining sex with a victim under age twelve as a Class B
felony); id. § 944.06 (defining incest as a Class F felony); id. § 939.50 (providing that Class B
felonies carry a maximum sixty-year sentence, while Class F felonies carry a maximum twelve-
year-and-six-month sentence); id. § 939.616 (providing that sex with a victim under age thirteen
carries a minimum twenty-five-year bifurcated sentence).
80. See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-314 (2007) (providing that sex with a victim under age
eighteen by an individual who is the victim's legal guardian, or a victim under age thirteen if
the individual is age sixteen or older, carries a maximum fifty-year sentence); id. § 6-4-402
(providing that incest carries a maximum fifteen-year sentence).
81. For example, New York's statutory scheme contained the probation and incest
loopholes until 2006, thereby allowing prosecutors to charge parental offenders with incest
rather than rape and, thus, preserve their eligibility for probation. Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW §
130.35 (Consol. 2000) (defining rape of a child under the age of eleven as a Class B felony),
with id. § 255.25 (defining incest as a Class E felony); see also id. §§ 255.25-27 (Supp. 2007)
(containing the amended provisions, which create multiple degrees of incest and define first-
degree incest as a Class B felony); Andrew Vachss, Op-Ed., The Incest Loophole, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
25, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 18733401 (decrying the existence of the incest loophole
created by New York's statutory scheme). In large part because of the recent article in 0, The
Oprah Magazine, see generally Goodwin, supra note 48, I am hopeful we will soon see more
legislative action in this area.
[2007]
LAD Y MADONNA, CHILDREN A T YOUR FEET
less serious offense than other kinds of sexual assaults and, therefore,
warrants a less serious penalty.
Another way in which parents can receive preferential statutory
treatment is exemption from sexual-offender-registration requirements."'
Following the highly publicized murder of a seven-year-old girl in NewJersey
by a convicted sex offender, every state enacted some variant of a law
requiring convicted sex offenders to register with the state; many also
created various mechanisms to notify citizens if a sex offender was residing
in their communties. In a recent article, Rose Corrigan focused on the
implementation of Megan's Law in NewJersey.8 4 NewJersey uses something
called a "Registrant Risk Assessment Scale" to determine an offender's risk
of reoffending. Offenders deemed to have higher risk levels are subject to
more extensive community-notification requirements. One of the scale's
criteria is "victim selection." Offenders who victimize strangers are given the
highest possible score under this criterion, while offenders who victimize
"household/family" members, biological children, or stepchildren are givenS 86
the lowest possible score and deemed to be low-risk offenders. Corrigan
argues that New Jersey's view of "incest as a crime rarely committed and
seldom repeated means that in many jurisdictions, acquaintances and
intimates are, by definition, incapable of being 'predators' for the purposes
of registration and notification. ""' Further, "individuals convicted of incest
are excluded from the state's online sex offender database."88
82. California is one example. Parental offenders convicted of certain sexual offenses can
apply to be excluded from California's Internet web site identifying sexual offenders, whereas
extrafamilial offenders convicted of the same offenses cannot. See California
Department of Justice, Sex Offender Registration and Exclusion Information, http://
www.meganslaw.ca.gov/sexreg.aspx (last visited Sept. 11, 2007) (describing the exclusion
program).
83. For a comprehensive listing of the sex-offender-registration laws in all fifty states and
the District of Columbia, see Doron Teichman, Sex, Shame, and the Law: An Economic Perspective
on Megan's Laws, 42 HARV.J. ON LEGIs. 355 app. at 415 (2005), which collects the statutes.
84. Rose Corrigan, Making Meaning of Megan's Law, 31 [Aw & SOC. INQUIRY 267 (2006).
85. Id. at 285.
86. See id. at 291; see also OFFICE OF THE NJ. ATTORNEY GEN., ATTORNEY GENERAL
GUIDELINES FOR LAw ENFORCEMENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION
AND COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAws exhibit E at 5 (2005), available at http://www.state.
nj.us/lps/dcj/megan/meganguidelinesl-05.pdf (providing the New Jersey Registratant Risk
Assessment Scale Manual). Corrigan reports that the manual accompanying the scale explains
this classification as justified because "'intrafamilial offenders hav[e] the lowest base rate of
reoffense." Corrigan, supra note 84, at 291.
87. Corrigan, supra note 84, at 299.
88. See id. at 301. Corrigan notes that this exclusion was supported by rape-care advocates
in order to promote victim confidentiality. Even if the exclusion does protect victims, however,
it clearly gives offenders the obvious benefit of avoiding identification as a sex offender to
friends, employers, and other members of the community. This is particularly problematic in
light of research suggesting that many incest offenders crossoffend, in that they also abuse
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2. Disparities in Prosecution and Conviction Rates for
Child Sexual-Assault Cases
The previous Section demonstrated how the romanticization
phenomenon is reflected in various state statutory schemes, but the
phenomenon's impact extends beyond the statute books. Although there
has been little empirical work about prosecution and conviction rates in the
context of sexual abuse crimes committed against children by family
members,8 the available evidence suggests that parents who abuse their own
children, rather than strangers, are charged less often and sentenced less
severely than adults who abuse nonrelatives. In terms of charging, for
example, one study of sexual assaults that took place between 1991 and 1996
concluded that "[a] n offender was arrested in just 19% of the sexual assaults
of children under age 6."90 This low arrest rate is particularly striking in light
of the fact that forty-nine percent of the defendants who assaulted children
under the age of six were family members of their victims, while only three
percent were strangers-a statistic that would presumably reduce the
difficulties for police and prosecutors associated with identifying and
locating an offender.9 '
One study conducted in the early 1990s by a social worker concluded
that "[c]learly, where the abuser is outside the family, cases are handled
more aggressively by the legal system." 92 For example, "only half as many
extra-family cases were diverted to treatment," rather than remaining in the
criminal justice system. 93 A slightly more recent study concluded that
"[t]here was a trend toward non-referral for prosecution when the accused
victims outside their immediate families. See infra notes 161-66 and accompanying text
(discussing this research).
89. See HOWARD SNYDER, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL
ASSAULT OF YOUNG CHILDREN AS REPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM, INCIDENT, AND
OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS 1 (2000) (stating that "while a few highly publicized incidents are
engraved in the public's consciousness, there is little empirically-based information" about
"sexual assaults of young children"); see also Charles Phipps, Children, Adults, Sex and the Law, 22
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 104 (1997) ("[V]irtually no information is available on how often
sexual crimes against children are prosecuted in the United States."). Indeed, it is important to
note a key limitation of many of the studies discussed in this Section and in Part B-they are
now several years old. It is, of course, possible that prosecution rates might have changed in
recent years, and this area is ripe for future research.
90. SNYDER, supra note 89, at 11. Moreover, "even when considering all means of
clearances [such as closing a case due to the death of the suspect], the youngest victims (under
age 6) still had the smallest proportion of their victimizations cleared by law enforcement." Id.
at 12.
91. Id. at 10. In contrast, "just 12% of the offenders who sexually assaulted adults were
family members of the victims." Id.
92. GRAY, supra note 27, at 114. Gray studied the handling of child sexual abuse cases in
eight different jurisdictions across the country: Baltimore County, Maryland; Clay, Duval, and
Nassau Counties, Florida; Dallas County, Texas; Jefferson County, Kentucky; Johnson County,
Kansas; Orleans Parrish, Louisiana; St. Louis, Missouri; and San Francisco, California. Id. at 26.
93. Id.
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was more closely related to the child victim .... Police referred 79% of the
cases involving stranger perpetrators to the [district attorney]'s office
compared to only 52% of the cases involving parent/stepparent alleged
offenders. 9 4 Indeed, this study concluded that the "lowest percentage of
criminal-action cases observed was when the perpetrator was thought to be a
parent/stepparent.
9 5
In terms of sentencing, another 1990s-era study surveyed 600
prosecutors who handled child sexual abuse cases. Seventy-two percent of
the respondents "agreed with the statement that 'intrafamilial cases result in
more lenient sentences.' 96 A study from the mid-1980s of 388 "founded"
cases, or cases where social workers believed the underlying allegations,
determined that "[plarents were less likely to be prosecuted, and, if
prosecuted, they often received little or no incarceration and surprisingly
short periods of probation."97
Of course, child sexual abuse can be very difficult to prove. There are
typically no witnesses to the abuse other than the child victim, and children
may have a difficult time testifying convincingly due to youth or trauma.98
94. Delores D. Stroud, Sonja L. Martens & Julia Barker, Criminal Investigation of Child
Sexual Abuse: A Comparison of Cases Referred to the Prosecutor to Those Not Referred, 24 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 689, 694 (2000). This study looked at cases involving 1,043 children who were
allegedly the victims of sexual abuse by adults between January 1, 1993, and December 31, 1996,
in one county in New Mexico. Id.
95. Id. at 697. But see Tausha L. Bradshaw & Alan E. Marks, Beyond A Reasonable Doubt:
Factors that Influence the Legal Disposition of Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 36 CRIME & DELINQ. 276, 284
(1990) (reviewing 350 cases of child sexual abuse in a Texas county and concluding, without
providing any statistics, that "the child's relationship to the offender had [no] impact on the
decision to prosecute"). Even in this study, only 34.6% of the cases resulted in a conviction or
plea before trial. Id. at 281 tbl.1.
96. BARBARA E. SMITH & SHARON GORETSKY ELSTEIN, AM. BAR ASS'N, THE PROSECUTION OF
CHILD SEXUAL AND PHYSICAL ABUSE CASES: FINAL REPORT 45, 143 (1993). An earlier American
Bar Association report of 159 prosecuted cases reached several interesting conclusions, though
it is important to note this study is now twenty years old. See generally JANE ROBERTS CHAPMAN &
BARBARA E. SMITH, AM. BAR ASS'N CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: AN
ANALYSIS OF CASE PROCESSING (1987). First, "strangers who molested children were incarcerated
in 86 percent of cases, while parents molesting their children were incarcerated less
frequently-in about 65 percent of cases." Id. at 27. Moreover, "[i]t is in length of sentence that
the greatest differences are apparent"-58% of strangers who molested children received a
sentence of ten years or more; 68% of parents who molested their children received a sentence
of twelve months or less. Id. at 27-28. A second phase of this study that looked at police and
social-services case files in two different counties concluded that "[p]arents who sexually abused
their children were less often arrested and prosecuted and received shorter sentences than
abusers with other relationships to their victims." Id. at 82.
97. Jane Roberts Chapman & Barbara Smith, Response of Social Service and Criminal Justice
Agencies to Child Sexual Abuse Complaints, 10 RESPONSE TO VICTIMIZATION WOMEN & CHILDREN 7,
13 (1987). Unfortunately, Smith and Chapman do not provide the precise statistics behind this
conclusion; they do note, however, that only "40 percent of the cases in the sample were
eventually prosecuted." Id.
98. See I JOHN E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES § 5.1 (3d ed.
1997); see also 2 id. § 6.45, at 121 ("Psychological research indicates that many jurors 'enter the
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But these problems should not explain the prosecution disparity; they would
seem to apply equally whether the offender is a parent or an acquaintance.99
Perhaps one possible reason for the disparity is the fear of fabrication when
a charge is leveled against one parent in the context of a divorce or custody
proceeding. Estimates as to the percentage of allegations that are in fact
fabrications vary, but the popular perception of spurned and fabricating
mothers seems clearly incorrect. 00 Two relatively recent studies concluded
that "the rate of reports of abuse during custody and parental access
disputes [is] only two to five percent, and the rate of substantiation of these
reports is the same as for reports that do not occur during custody
disputes."'0 '
There are certainly other factors that potentially could affect
prosecutorial and jury decision making. Maybe parents are less likely to have
a prior criminal history, for example. 102 Maybe prosecutors' primary concern
is avoiding the breakup of a family. The romanticization phenomenon may
not be the only reason behind the disparity of treatment, but it is an
important one: we do not want to believe that a parent could sexually abuse
a child. "It is much easier for community members to believe that the child
is confused and misinterpreted an innocent touch or an act, or that the
child is lying out of vindictiveness toward the suspect.",0 3 We also persist in
courtroom with doubts about the credibility of child witnesses.'" (quoting Gail S. Goodman et
al., Jurors' Reactions to Child Witnesses,J. Soc. ISSUES, Summer 1984, at 139, 139)); Theodore P.
Cross, Debra Whitcomb & Edward De Vos, Criminal Justice Outcomes of Child Sexual Abuse: A Case
Flow Analysis, 19 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1431, 1432 (1995) ("[P]rosecution can be difficult
because of public skepticism about allegations, the challenges of obtaining evidence, and the
frequent necessity of relying on child victims' testimony."). For a discussion of why testifying can
be so difficult for children, see Debra Whitcomb, Prosecuting Child Sexual Abuse-New Approaches,
NIJ REP., May 1986, at 2, 2-5.
99. Children may, of course, report the abuse less frequently when the offender is a parent.
See, e.g., Stroud, Martens & Barker, supra note 94, at 697 (concluding that children were
significantly less likely to disclose sexual abuse when the offender was a parent). The studies
discussed above, however, involved cases where law enforcement was aware of the allegations.
100. See, e.g., 1 MYERS, supra note 98, § 5.5, at 437-41 (collecting some older studies). The
various studies Myers cited estimated fabrication rates in custody cases as between twenty and
fifty-five percent. See id. at 438-39. These studies all involved very small sample sizes, however.
See id. Interestingly, another study estimated the fabrication rate for all cases of child sexual
abuse at approximately eight percent. See id. at 437 (citing David P.H. Jones et al., Reliable and
Fictitious Accounts of Sexual Abuse to Children, 2J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 27, 28 (1986)).
101. NAT'L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF
CHILD ABUSE 29 (3d ed. 2004) (describing the studies).
102. I was unable to find any studies that used a multiple-regression analysis to try to break
out the statistical significance of these different factors; this area is ripe for future research.
103. NAT'L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, supra note 101, at 73; see also id. at 178
(discussing the phenomenon of "juries who would rather believe anything other than a
seemingly normal person gratifying his sexual desires at the expense of a helpless child victim");
SMITH & ELSTEIN, supra note 96, at 71 (describing prosecutors' complaints about "public
disbelief that child sexual abuse occurs, particularly within the family (society wants to believe
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our belief that parents who would molest a child must be mentally ill and,
thus, that families would be better served by mental health treatment rather
than intervention from the criminal justice system. °4 We also see the same
phenomenon here that exists in physical abuse cases: families often are
more supportive of the suspect than the child. For example, in summarizing
the findings of a survey of 600 prosecutors, the American Bar Association
reported that "[w]e were told time and time again that nonoffending
parents (most often mothers) are likely to pressure children to recant, citing
economic hardships once the family bread-winner is removed from the
home orjailed. " 1
5
B. THE DImicuLTY OF SECURING CoNvIc7ioNs IN CHI1D HOMICIDE CASES
One of the most striking examples of the romanticization phenomenon
is the difficulty prosecutors face in charging and convicting parents when a
child dies due to parental abuse or neglect. As one prosecutor has said,
"Juries don't want to believe parents could kill a child. They want to believe
it was an accident and will look for every possible explanation but
murder.""
06
Of course, just like child sexual abuse cases, child homicide cases
present unique evidentiary problems. The fatal abuse is typically inflicted
within the confines of a home, virtually eliminating the possibility of
outsider eyewitness testimony. Additionally, multiple adults may be present
in the home at the time of the abuse, making it difficult to determine which
adult was the culprit. 107 Fatal abuse often is inflicted with the hands,
that the offender looks different from everyone else and is a perverted stranger, rather than a
trusted family member)").
104. See NAT'L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, supra note 101, at 170 (noting
public opinion that anyone who would sexually abuse a child must be "sick").
105. SMITH & ELSTEIN, supra note 96, at 48; see also NAT'L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD
ABUSE, supra note 101, at 76 ("[I]n a large percentage of [sexual abuse] cases, the victim's
family is supportive of the offender by the time the case comes to trial."). It is important to note
that these two sources are addressing issues from a prosecutorial perspective, but they are
nonetheless indicative of the problems prosecutors believe they face.
106. Ruth Teichroeb, Cases Among Toughest to Prosecute; Juries Don't Want to Believe Parents
Could Kill a Child, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 1, 2002, at Al (quoting King County
Deputy Prosecutor Lisa Johnson); see also Tucker, supra note 5 ("[A lack of witnesses] make[s]
child homicides among the toughest prosecutions in the trade; jurors just don't want to believe
that a parent could beat a child to death, torture him, starve him."). There are interesting
parallels here to wife-battering. Elizabeth Schneider has argued, for example, that women in
particular need to "deny the pervasiveness of the problem so as not to link it to their own life
situations" and that 'jurors ... try to remove themselves and say that it could never happen to
me." Schneider, supra note 46, at 984.
107. See Lissa Griffin, "Which One of You Did It?" Criminal Liability for "Causing or Allowing" the
Death of a Child, 15 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 89, 89 (2004) (identifying the special problems
involved in prosecuting child homicide cases); cf John E.B. Myers, Adjudication of Child Sexual
Abuse Cases, FUTURE CHILDREN, Summer-Fall 1994, at 84, 84-85 (noting that child sexual abuse
is also very difficult to prove because there may be no eyewitnesses other than the victim).
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eliminating the possibility of locating a murder weapon that might help
establish the identity of the defendant through fingerprints or purchase
records. 108
But I believe something more than evidentiary problems is at work
here. Because we romanticize the parent-child relationship, we need denial
and, thus, are unwilling to grapple with the possibility that a parent could
intentionally and malevolendy choose to inflict harm upon a child.' 9 This
unwillingness to believe accusations of abuse is found both in family
members of the suspect, who often continue to support the accused, 110 and
in the general public. For example, in fatal neglect cases, 'juries identify
with the accused, believing any parent can make a mistake."I"' This
identification phenomenon extends to cases of physical abuse: "Most
members of the general public have been stressed themselves by child care
responsibilities and feel some sense of sympathy for the abuser, who is seen
as having lost control."' 2 In cases of nonfatal abuse, the romanticization of
the family relationship and parent-child bond is particularly invidious:
"Unlike victims of most other crimes, child victims of abuse are sometimes
castigated as villains by family members and friends who hold them
responsible for the break-up of the family."
' 3
108. See Tucker, supra note 5 ("[K]ids... are primarily dispatched with some blunt object
that's never found. No fingerprints. No murder weapon.").
109. See NAT'L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, supra note 101, at 169 ("Underlying
all child abuse prosecutions is a public desire to disbelieve what studies show to be a high
prevalence of sexual and physical abuse of children."); 1 AM. BAR ASS'N CTR. ON CHILDREN &
THE LAW ET AL.,JUSTICE SYSTEM PROCESSING OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES: FINAL REPORT
15 (1996) ("Every professional interviewed stressed the difficulty in prosecuting cases because
the general public, and thus jurors, are extremely reluctant to believe physical child abuse
allegations.").
110. See Teichroeb, supra note 106 ("Families side with the suspect, unwilling to face the
truth."). Another prosecutor in Washington stated that "'often the parent who is not
responsible will cover up for the other one. They seem to think "well, the child is gone, so I
might as well keep the relationship."'" Id. (quoting Pierce County prosecutor Sunni Ko). A
prosecutor in the District of Columbia who specializes in child homicides noted that "'[t]he
people who come to the hearings are either there for the mother or the father. None of them
talks about the dead kid.'" Tucker, supra note 5 (quoting prosecutorJuneJeffries).
111. Teichroeb, supra note 106. As one attorney in Washington said, "'A lot of our biases as
a society are toward protecting the parents, not the kids.'" Id. (quoting former King County
special assault unit prosecutor Kathy Goatering).
112. NAT'L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, supra note 101, at 170; see also AM. BAR
ASS'N CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE LAW ET AL., supra note 109, at 4-25 (describing an interview with
the head of child abuse prosecution unit in San Diego who "expressed the opinion" that
"U]urors simply do not believe that parents, or caretakers, intentionally harm their children, but
instead see the injuries as the accidental result of discipline and corporal discipline that parents
can, and often should, impose").
113. NAT'L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, supranote 101, at 1.
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Scholars have done little empirical work on this issue, and the area is
ripe for future research.' 14 One twenty-year-old study looked at the "criminal
disposition of persons involved in 72 cases of fatal child abuse" at a
Columbus, Ohio, pediatric hospital between 1965 and 1984.'15 The findings
led the authors to conclude that "it is relatively simple for a parent or
caretaker to kill a young child without criminal consequences since the
crime can be committed in virtual secrecy or isolation. """ No charges were
filed against more than half of the sixty-three perpetrators identified as
being involved in fifty-seven total incidents.'1 7 For fifty-seven out of the
seventy-two child deaths studied, or seventy-eight percent, no one served any
jail time. 118
114. See ANIA WILCZYNSKI, CHILD HOMICIDE 12 (1997) ("[Wle know very little at all about
how child-killers are dealt with by the criminal justice system."). One fascinating recent study,
for example, attempted to determine how the nature of the relationship between an offender
and a victim affected criminal justice decision making but unfortunately lumped cases of
parents who killed their children together with all other family-member killings (except for
those killings involving intimate or romantic partners). See Myrna Dawson, Rethinking the
Boundaries of Intimacy at the End of the Century: The Role of Victim-Defendant Relationship in Criminal
Justice Decision-Making over Time, 38 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 105, 105 (2004) (investigating whether the
degree of intimacy between victims and defendants affects legal responses to violence).
Although I believe this category is overbroad, Dawson nonetheless reached the interesting
conclusion that defendants who killed family members on average "received sentences close to
two and a half years shorter than for those who killed strangers." Id. at 125.
115. Showers & Apolo, supra note 6, at 243. There is also relatively little research on
prosecution rates in cases involving nonfatal abuse. See AM. BAR ASS'N CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE
LAW ET AL., supra note 109, at 2-2 ("[T]here is virtually no empirical literature addressing the
contemporary judicial processing of child abuse and neglect cases."); Myers, supra note 107, at
92 ("Few national data are collected, however, about the percentage of investigated child abuse
cases that are prosecuted."). One study, which looked at 833 substantiated cases of child abuse
in Los Angeles, Denver, and Newcastle County, Delaware, from 1985 to 1986, concluded that
"nonparent adult perpetrators and juvenile perpetrators were significantly more likely to be
prosecuted than the biological parents of the victim." Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes,
Predictors of Legal Intervention in Child Maltreatment Cases, 16 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 807, 816
(1992). One more recent study involved a meta-analysis of other studies about child abuse
prosecutions. See Theodore Cross et al., Prosecution of Child Abuse: A Meta-Analysis of Criminal
Justice Decisions, 4 TRAUMA VIOLENCE & ABUSE 323, 323-25 (2003). Although this study did not
investigate the treatment of parental offenders as compared to non-parental offenders, see id., it
reached a number of interesting conclusions. For example, the authors concluded that "child
abuse was less likely to lead to filing charges and incarceration than most other felonies but
more likely to be carried forward without dismissal" if charges were filed. Id. at 323. The authors
hypothesized that "the lower incarceration rate may be a function of child abuse perpetrators'
frequent close relationship to victims, which may lead judges to perceive child abuse as less
serious or to avoid incarceration because of the impact they believe it will have on the family."
Id. at 336.
116. Showers & Apolo, supra note 6, at 246.
117. Some of the incidents involved more than one perpetrator, and in some cases, a
perpetrator could not be identified. Id. at 244.
118. Id. at 246. One other very interesting finding from the study was that "female
caretakers are less likely than males to be charged, convicted, and imprisoned." Id. Only two
women served any jail time in the cases studied. Id.
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A study conducted of child killings in Australia, although using a
relatively small sample size, found that cases where parents killed children
received preferential treatment as compared to cases where strangers killed
children. 119 For example, parental killers were much less likely to be
convicted of murder than non-familial killers; parental killers typically
received manslaughter convictions stea.20
I recently conducted a study examining disparities in the prosecution of
fatal neglect cases. That research showed parents clearly receive preferential
treatment by the criminal justice system vis-a-vis other caregivers when a
child dies because of adult negligence.12 The empirical study examined
cases over a six-year period where children died of hyperthermia after being
left unattended in motor vehicles on hot days. 122 Parents were prosecuted in
53.75% of such incidents, a surprisingly high percentage in light of the
common perception that parents are rarely prosecuted in cases involving
deaths due to parental negligence.12 However, individuals not related to the
victim were prosecuted at strikingly higher rates, in 88.8% of cases where I
was able to trace the prosecution history.
124
There also appear to be disparities in sentencing, an additional area for
future research. A senior attorney with the National Center for Prosecution
of Child Abuse reports that offenders often receive shorter sentences for
killing a child than for killing an adult, in part because parents are often
charged with less serious offenses in the context of child deaths.115 The
119. See WILCZYNSKI, supra note 114, at 171-79. Wilczynski examined the cases of twenty-five
victims. Id.
120. See id. at 174. Only one of the filicide offenders was convicted of murder, as compared
to thirteen of the fifteen nonfamilial offenders.
121. See Jennifer M. Collins, Crime and Parenthood: The Uneasy Case for Prosecuting Negligent
Parents, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 807, 828 (2006).
122. Id. at 820-24.
123. Id. at 828; see, e.g., CHRISTINE ALDER & KEN POLK, CHILD VICTIMS OF HOMICIDE 20
(2001) (stating, without citation, that prosecutions are "uncommon" when a child dies as the
result of parental negligence, such as being left unattended in a bathtub or in a house where a
fire later broke out); Zimring, supra note 8, at 532 (asserting, without citation, that
"[t]housands of children die accidentally each year because negligently supervised by parents,
but only a trickle of cases are prosecuted in the United States").
124. Collins, supra note 121, at 828. A chi-square analysis confirmed that the difference in
prosecution rates is statistically significant at a ninety-nine percent confidence level; the p-value
was 0.0011. Id.
125. See Teichroeb, supra note 106 (citing an interview with Dawn Wilsey). Wilsey noted
that the difficulty involved with proving premeditation often accounts for the charging
decisions. Id. Indeed, in many other countries there are often statutes in place that guarantee
less severe sentences. Michelle Oberman reports that "[m]any nations around the world have
statutes specific to infanticide; all but one of these makes infanticide a less severe crime than
ordinary homicide." Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Coming to Terms with Modern American
Infanticide, 8 DEPAULJ. HEALTH CARE L. 3, 22 (2004).
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Australian study referenced above concluded that parental killers received
much lighter sentences than non-familial killers.'26
At this point, a reader might be thinking, "Wait a minute; we are tough
on parents who kill their children. What about Susan Smith and Andrea
Yates?" I agree that there are some cases where the criminal justice system
treats parents very harshly, but these cases typically have some "aggravating"
factors like multiple victims or a sensational back story. 27 Engage in a
thought experiment for a minute. Can you think of the names of any other
mothers, or fathers for that matter, who have killed their children? The
outcome of two highly publicized cases does not mean that we are tough on
parents who commit crimes against their children.
C. THE PAREArAL DISCIPLINE DEFENSE
At this point, I want to turn away from the crimes of homicide and rape
to a more common form of violence committed against children--corporal
punishment. This issue is important within the larger context of this Article
not only because some child homicide cases involve the appropriateness of
corporal punishment, but also because our continuing acceptance of this
practice reflects the romanticization phenomenon. We trust that parents will
use physical force against their children in an appropriate way, whereas we
are far less willing to endorse the practice of unrelated adults hitting
children. More fundamentally, I believe the continued prevalence of
corporal punishment contributes to our current cultural mindset of
minimization and denial in relation to parental violence, an issue that Part
IV of this Article develops more fully.
Spanking continues to be an incredibly common practice in America.
Approximately ninety percent of Americans hit or spank their children, and
128every state currently gives parents "some form of a privilege" to do So.
126. WILCZYNSKI, supra note 114, at 174; see also Oberman, supra note 125, at 50 (stating that
the criminal justice outcomes in the infanticide cases she studied "tend to reflect a pattern of
lenience").
127. Andrea Yates, for example, killed five children and had a documented history of
mental illness coupled with a demanding spouse whose unsupportive conduct was perceived as
contributing to the horrific outcome in that case. Susan Smith also killed multiple victims and
attempted to pin her sons' disappearance on an African-American man, thereby whipping up a
media frenzy. Michelle Obenrnan makes some interesting points in this regard. She writes that
"[t]he rhetoric of moral outrage expressed by society at large and by judges and juries in
individual cases is accompanied by an equally strong tendency to view these crimes as arising out
of external circumstances, and therefore to resist equating [infanticides] with murder."
Oberman, supra note 125, at 6 (emphasis added); see also id. at 82 (referring to the "dialectic of
moral outrage and legal mercy"). Oberman adds that "[i]ronically, in both historical and
contemporary societies, the tendency to treat infanticide as less heinous than other forms of
murder is seldom acknowledged." Id. at 6.
128. Deana Pollard, Banning Child Corporal Punishment, 77 TUL. L. REv. 575, 577 (2003).
Pollard explains that some states maintain the defense through "common law applications of
the defense of justification," while other states have formally codified the defense. Id. at 635.
93 IOWA LA WREVIEW
States provide this opening through the mechanism of the parental
discipline defense.
The parental discipline defense operates in different ways in different
states, but in general terms, it provides a parent or guardian with a defense
to a criminal charge involving the use of force against a child as long as the
parent was intending to discipline the child through the use of force and did
not use unduly dangerous force. Several states base their laws on the Model
Penal Code, which states:
The use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable
if: (1) the actor is the parent or guardian .. .and: (a) the force is
used for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of
the minor, including the prevention or punishment of his
misconduct; and (b) the force used is not designed to cause or
known to create a substantial risk of causing death, serious bodily
injury, disfigurement, extreme pain or mental distress or gross
degradation ... 129
This defense can be raised in both fatal and non-fatal cases of abuse.13 °
There is a contrast here with our attitudes toward the use of corporal
punishment by someone other than the child's parent. Although every state
retains a variant of the parental discipline defense,'13 twenty-seven states and
the District of Columbia have outlawed the use of corporal punishment in
public schools. 3 2 Moreover, "thirty-seven states prohibit foster parents from
spanking; forty-two states do not allow corporal punishment in residential
institutions and agency group homes; thirty-nine states prohibit it in day-care
centers; and thirty-two prohibit such punishment in family-care centers." 13 3
Franklin Zimring cites an intriguing hypothetical posed by Roger Mclntire
involving a careless child in a supermarket who accidentally knocks a group
of oranges to the floor. '4 Imagine that the child's mother then "'grabs the
daughter, shakes her vigorously, and slaps her.""3 5 Mclntire asks us if we
For another discussion of the history and scope of the parental discipline defense, see generally
Kandice Johnson, Crime or Punishment: The Parental Corporal Punishment Defense-Reasonable and
Necessary, or Excused Abuse?, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 413.
129. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08 (1985); see also Pollard, supra note 128, at 637-38
(discussing the Model Penal Code provision and the fact that its language is relied upon by a
number of states).
130. See Pollard, supra note 128, at 621 ("[T]he defense of 'discipline' is raised in forty-one
percent of homicide prosecutions against parents who 'accidentally' killed their child through
discipline.").
131. Id. at 577.
132. Id. at 593. Pollard also notes that "an additional eleven states had banned it against
most public school children by local rules." Id. at 593.
133. Id. at 586.
134. See Zimring, supra note 8, at 523 (quoting Roger W. McIntire, Parenthood Training or
Mandatory Birth Control: Take Your Choice, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Oct. 1973, at 34, 36).
135. Id.
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would intervene or, instead, consider it a private matter for the family to
resolve. 36 He then asks us to imagine that the child in question is not
related to the mother and consider whether our responses change. 131 Is
there any doubt that we would be more outraged if the irate mother slapped
someone else's child and not her own daughter?
38
Why this disparity in both public attitudes and legal standards? Do we
believe parental motives to be more benign than those of the unrelated
caregiver? In either the daycare or the home, it seems clear that the
caregiver could decide to spank a child solely because the child disobeyed
the caregiver-a classic context in which the parental discipline defense
would be recognized. So even when the motives underlying the use of force
are the same, we give more latitude to the parent. Thus, ascribing the
differential treatment to a difference in motive is plainly unsatisfactory.
Can we explain the disparity by the notion that we trust parents to be
more benevolent in the use of physical force? This answer hardly seems
satisfactory either. As any parent of a young child can attest, the monotony
and relentlessness of child care demands can lead to a feeling of blind rage
about your own child's misbehavior that far exceeds any rage that someone
else's child could incite. The answer must be, in part, that we feel more
uncomfortable about intervening in the realm of the family than in the
realm of the daycare or the schoolhouse because of our concerns about
intruding too far into a zone of family privacy. But we need to recognize that
children often need more protection at home than in school-in school
there will often be other adults or children present who could intervene if
the punishment becomes excessive. In the home, children are more likely to
be utterly alone.
III. OBJECTIONS TO USING THE CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM IN CASES INVOLVING
FAMILY VIOLENCE
What are some of the objections raised to the more aggressive use of
criminal prosecution to confront the problem of violence committed against
children? I believe we can usefully group the objections into two categories.
The first set of objections is normative and revolves around the notion that
parental offenders are simply different than other perpetrators and, thus,
warrant differential treatment. The second set of objections is instrumental
and revolves around the idea that the criminal justice system is, in fact, not
the most effective approach that we could use to protect our children.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See PLECK, supra note 24, at 9 ("[Iln many areas of law a stranger is entitled to more
legal protection than a family member.").
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A. PARENTAL OFFENDERS ARE DIbiREATf
1. Deterrence Through the Criminal Justice System Is Unnecessary
One common objection to bringing parental offenders into the
criminal justice system is that prosecution is unnecessary because parents
already have sufficient incentives to avoid causing harm to their children.
The primary source of these incentives is, of course, the "natural bonds of
affection" that we persist in believing all parents feel for their children.139
In this regard, the criminal justice system has displayed a stubborn
unwillingness to recognize that social-science research should undermine, at
least with some parents, our unwavering belief in "parental concern for the
nurture and upbringing of their children." 40 Multiple researchers have
concluded that one feature of abusive or neglectful parents is that they have
"unrealistic expectations of the child" and, therefore, are quick to condemn
developmentally appropriate behavior as a justification for discipline.
4 1
Indeed, an uncomfortable truth is that some parents simply have negative
attitudes toward children. 142  "Abusive parents, when compared to
nonabusers . . . often perceive their own children as more aggressive,
disobedient, stupid, and annoying than other children."
143
139. See, e.g., Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2436 ("The utility of parents' affective bonds
and informal social norms in promoting desirable behavior reduces substantially the role for
formal legal incentives in mitigating conflicts of interest.").
140. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); see also MYERS, supra note 22, at 153
(stating that "in [his] experience, some professionals balk at coming to terms with deliberate,
intentional abuse"). Myers adds that "the medical model of maltreatment, with its emphasis on
illness, diagnosis, and treatment . . . so dominates writing and thinking about child
maltreatment that it squeezes out unvarnished analysis of deliberate abuse." Id. He further
argues that "[c]hild welfare professionals who resist seeing intentional abuse for what it is, and
who insist on viewing abuse and neglect exclusively through psychological lenses, dilute the
moral authority of society to condemn evil." Id. at 154; see also McMullen, supra note 22, at 592-
96 (explaining why we should question the law's general presumption that parents will
automatically and naturally act in the best interests of their children).
141. Renitta L. Goldman, An Educational Perspective on Abuse, in CHILDREN AT RISK: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 37, 42 (Renitta L. Goldman &
Richard M. Gargiuolo eds., 1990) (collecting studies).
142. See MARY ANN JONES, PARENTAL LACK OF SUPERVISION: NATURE AND CONSEQUENCE OF A
MAJOR CHILD NEGLECT PROBLEM 24-25 (1987). Jones studied 807 cases of child abuse or
neglect reported to the New York State Central Register for Child Abuse and Maltreatment
between July 1, 1982, and June 30, 1983. Id. at 3-6. Social workers reviewed ninety-nine of the
case records in depth and concluded that in fifteen percent of those cases, the parent left the
child unattended because of the "parent's negative attitude towards the child." Id. at 24. For a
concrete example of this phenomenon, see Harrington v. State, 547 S.W.2d 616, 618 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1977). In a statement given to police after her arrest for allowing her two-year-old
daughter to starve to death, the defendant said "she was a 'bad mother' and just did not like
small children." Id. at 618.
143. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A NATION'S SHAME: FATAL CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT IN THE UNITED STATES 123 (1995) (citing studies); see also MYERS, supra note 22, at 152
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Other parents lack an ability "to be sensitive to a child's needs and to
meet those needs." 144 Even parents who do not act out of deliberate
malevolence may abuse or neglect their children because their background
or personality characteristics simply render them ill-equipped to undertake
the enormously demanding job of parenting. James Gaudin, for example, in
his comprehensive 1993 report on child neglect issued by the Department of
Health and Human Services, noted that studies have found that neglectful
parents "lack knowledge of and empathy for children's age-appropriate
needs" and "have more unrealistic and more negative expectations of their
children than nonneglecting parents.
Therapy and support services can play a significant role in remedying
some of these problems. Parenting classes, for example, can educate parents
about what childhood behaviors are appropriate for each stage of
development. Better support systems, such as high quality and affordable
daycare, are critically important and could help reduce some of the stresses
associated with parenthood. We must confront the reality that our society
does a terrible job of supporting caregiving,146 and we must focus more of
our efforts and resources on "early warning and prevention, to the extent
possible."147 But we also should acknowledge that while therapy and social
services may help prevent future physical and sexual abuse, they do not
adequately redress that abuse after it has already occurred.
In other words, this Article suggests that we must take a two-pronged
approach: first, we must do a better job of supporting families and taking
steps to ensure that abuse does not occur in the first instance, and second, if
abuse has occurred despite our best efforts, we must take off the rose-
colored glasses we currently wear regarding the parent-child relationship
and give serious consideration to the use of prosecution to redress that
wrong. Giving consideration to the use of the criminal justice system is
important because "morality demands that the state inflict retribution for
("[Slome adults hurt children on purpose. A few are psychopaths, and fewer still are sadists
who enjoy inflicting pain. Most adults who deliberately hurt children are simply bullies.").
144. Goldman, supra note 141, at 42.
145. JAMES M. GAUDIN, JR., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD NEGLECT: A
GUIDE FOR INTERVENTION 15 (1993). Gaudin adds that "[m]any neglectful mothers are indeed
psychologically immature and childlike in their inabilities to consider the needs of others,
postpone gratification of basic impulses, and to invest themselves emotionally in another
person." Id. at 14; see also NORMAN POLANKSY ET AL., DAMAGED PARENTS: AN ANATOMY OF CHILD
NEGLECT 39, 40, 110-11 (1981) (noting that a significant percentage of neglectful parents
suffered from a syndrome he called "apathy-futility" syndrome, which is marked by, inter alia,
"feeling[s] of futility" and "lack of competence in many areas of living").
146. See, e.g., MARTHA FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 36-38
(2004).
147. JANE WALDFOGEL, THE FUTURE OF CHILD PROTECTION 88 (1998); see also Clare
Huntington, Mutual Dependency in Child Welfare, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1485, 1493 (2007)
(arguing that "a truly effective child welfare system . . . would seek to prevent child abuse and
neglect").
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certain serious moral wrongs.",14 Greater use of the criminal justice system
has the potential to shape a powerful normative message that violence
perpetrated by parents against their children is as blameworthy as violence
perpetrated by strangers, and that protecting family privacy cannot take
precedence over protecting the lives of society's youngest and most
vulnerable victims.
This is emphatically not to suggest that greater use of the criminal
justice system would be problem free. As we have seen in the context of
spousal abuse, the criminal justice system often represents an "imperfect
solution[]" to the problem of intimate violence. 49 Thus, increased
criminalization must not happen in a vacuum. We must provide better
support for American families. We must also be more sensitive to the needs
of children who have been victimized and "return the child's voice to the
'child welfare' system.""50 But as Part II of this Article demonstrated, the
criminal justice prong of a "coordinated community response" to the
problem of violence against children is currently underutilized, and we must
grapple with the question of whether greater criminalization can play more
of a role in better protecting our children.'5 1
2. Parental Offenders Have "Suffered Enough"
One oft-repeated objection to prosecuting parents who have lost a child
is that prosecution is unnecessary because the parent has already suffered
enough due to the loss itself, and therefore, any additional suffering
imposed by the criminal justice system is simply gratuitous and cruel. 152 It is
certainly true that for many individuals there can be no greater pain than
148. Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1701 (1992) (emphasis added).
149. ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, BArERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 185 (2000).
Professor Schneider's book contains an important and detailed discussion of the ambivalence
many feminists feel about greater criminalization of domestic violence. I believe that some of
the concerns regarding greater criminalization of spousal violence are not present to the same
extent in cases involving violence against children. For example, "the necessity to preserve a
woman's autonomy from excessive state intervention" is not as significant a concern if a child is
the victim-a child obviously does not possess autonomy interests in the same way as an adult.
Id. at 184. Young children do not have the ability to decide what kind of actions-for example,
not prosecuting a case criminally but instead fleeing to a shelter or obtaining a civil protection
order-would best protect them from future violence.
150. Marcia Sells, Child That's Got Her Own, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE,
supra note 24, at 130, 145 (emphasis added) (suggesting that we must increase our efforts to
listen to and respect an individual child's needs).
151. Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons ftom Navajo Peacemaking,
47 UCLA L. REV. 1, 48-49 (1999) (describing how in an ideal "coordinated response, criminal
sanctions are accompanied by strong supports for battered women"); see also SCHNEIDER, supra
note 149, at 187 (discussing Coker's article).
152. I discussed the relevance of parental suffering extensively in a prior article. See Collins,
supra note 121, at 832-46.
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the loss of a child and that the suffering endured by parents who face that
tragedy is almost unimaginable. This Article, however, focuses primarily on
parents who intentionally commit the most heinous crimes against their
children-the crimes of murder and rape. In those particular contexts, I
would suggest that parental suffering should be irrelevant to the decision
about whether to employ the sanctions of the criminal justice system. To
suggest otherwise would mean that we should grant mercy to the husband
who murdered his wife because he is now a widower or to the child who
killed her parents because she is now an orphan.
Even in cases where a child dies because of negligence, rather than
intentional conduct, allowing suffering to be the dominant factor in the
decision about whether to prosecute a parent undermines the value of the
life of the child victim in the eyes of the law. When we suggest that mercy is
warranted in a case where the victim is the defendant's own child,
presumably we would not extend the same mercy to a stranger who kills a
child-indeed, we view crimes against children as the most reprehensible of
offenses. In either case, however, the nature of the conduct is the same-the
taking of life-and the amount of harm caused is exactly the same-the loss
of an innocent life. The primary differences between the two scenarios are
the degree of personal relationship between the offender and the victim and
the extent to which that relationship, or lack thereof, causes the offender to
feel guilt, remorse, or pain as a result of the crime. To argue that killing a
child relative warrants less punishment than killing a child stranger is to
diminish the worth and importance of the life of that first victim.
153
Thus, emphasizing the importance of parental suffering to such an
extent elevates the suffering of the parent over the worth of the life of the
child in the calculus about whether to seek redress through the criminal
justice system. The fact that a parent is feeling emotional pain is given
greater weight than the fact that a child's life has unjustifiably been lost. This
is a classic example of a parent-centered view of family life that so often
permeates the criminal law-yet another illustration of our belief that love,
not law, and the pain that results from the loss of a loved one are sufficient
both to protect children in the first instance and to sanction those who
ultimately fail to protect.
3. Parental Offenders Are Less Dangerous
In absolute terms, of course, intrafamilial offenders pose the most
danger to children in homicide cases, rather than the least danger. Many
more young children die at the hands of family members than at those of
153. Cf ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 73 (1976)
("Understating the blame [involved in a criminal offense] depreciates the values that are
involved: disproportionately lenient punishment for murder implies that human life-the
victim's life-is not worthy of much concern . . ").
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acquaintances or strangers. In 2002, nearly two-thirds of all murder victims
under the age of thirteen were killed by a family member' 5 4 Another federal
report concluded that 872,000 children were the victims of abuse or neglect
in this country in 2004; approximately 79% of the perpetrators of that
maltreatment were parents. 5 5 This study also concluded that one or both
parents caused 78.9% of the 1,490 child fatalities in 2004.156
As for sexual abuse, strangers commit only 10% of child rapes. 5 7 For
children under the age of twelve, more than 80% of reported sexual assaults
were committed in the child's home.'58 Estimates as to what percentage of
these assaults parents commit vary; one government study concluded that
"just over one-fourth [of sexually abused children] were sexually abused by a
birth parent." 59 A particularly interesting finding of this study was that "a
sexually abused child was most likely to sustain a serious injury or
impairment when a birth parent was the perpetrator."' °
Even if parental offenders as a class pose the most danger to children,
perhaps parental offenders are less dangerous than other offenders on an
individual basis, both because they are less likely to reoffend and, if they do
reoffend, they are unlikely to select targets outside the family. 61 In the
154. See DUROSE ET AL., supra note 3, at 18.
155. ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
CHILD MALTREATMENT 2004, at xiii, xviii (2006) [hereinafter CHILD MALTREATMENT 2004],
available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm04/cmO4.pdf.
156. Id. at 65-66.
157. Kim English et al., Sex Offender Containment: Use of the Postconviction Polygraph, 989
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 411, 412 (2003); see alsoJon Conte, The Incest Offender: An Overview and
Introduction, in THE INCEST PERPETRATOR: A FAMILY MEMBER NO ONE WANTS TO TREAT 19, 19
(Anne L. Horton et al. eds., 1990) ("[C]hildren are more likely to be sexually abused by
members of their own families and by acquaintances than by strangers.").
158. English et al., supra note 157, at 412.
159. ANDREAJ. SEDLAK & DIANE D. BROADHURST, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
THIRD NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: FINAL REPORT 8-12 (1996).
Rose Corrigan reports that "[i]ncest offenses . . . constitute approximately 46 percent of
convictions for sexual assaults committed against children." Corrigan, supra note 84, at 291
(emphasis omitted).
160. SEDLAK & BROADHURST, supra note 159, at 8-13; see also LAWRENCE GREENFELD,
BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS 12 (1997)
(reporting that about "a quarter of parent-child rapes resulted in major injury," defined as
"severe lacerations, fractures, internal injuries, or unconsciousness").
161. See, e.g., Leonore Simon, Legal Treatment of the Victim-Offender Relationship in Crimes of
Violence, 11 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 94, 95 (1996) (describing "public opinion that is more
fearful of stranger violence" and stating that "stranger offenders are perceived to be more
dangerous, unpredictable, and indiscriminate in their selection of victims compared to
nonstranger offenders"). It is important to note that the question of recidivism rates for any
type of sexual offender continues to be controversial. Compare, e.g., Ron Langevin et al., Lifetime
Sexual Offender Recidivism: A 25-Year Follow-Up Study, 46 CANADIANJ. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM.JUST.
531, 548 (2004) (concluding that approximately three in five sex offenders committed another
sexual offense), with Cheryl M. Webster et al., Results by Design: The Artefactual Construction of
High Recidivism Rates for Sex Offenders, 48 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 79 passim
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context of sexual abuse, for example, some opponents of prosecution argue
that sexual abusers who victimize family members are less dangerous
because they are more amenable to treatment.162 For example, consider the
following comments made by Deborah Johnson, a clinical psychologist who
runs an organization called Parents United International, which conducts
offender recovery programs:
"Incest is the most treatable offense on the books .... Most incest
offenders are not pedophiles. Fixated offenders are predatory
toward children, but these [pedophiles] are in the minority. The
majority of incest offenders are what we call regressed offenders,
people who, for example, under stress, turn to kids. When you've
had a crappy day at work and your boss yelled at you, and your little
5-year-old pats you on the cheek and says how much she loves you,
if you have really bad self-esteem-and if your boundaries are poor
and you confuse sex with affection-it's not a huge leap to
incest. 
161
What a remarkable example of the tendency to minimize the severity of
intrafamilial sexual abuse! However, researchers are increasingly rebutting
these assumptions, concluding instead that "it used to be assumed that
incest offenders could be clearly separated from other child molesters, but
(2006) (criticizing the Langevin study). Interestingly, Langevin concluded that incest offenders
"showed higher recidivism rates than generally reported in the literature, with one in two
reoffending based on sex offense convictions . ... Their recidivism rates did not differ
significantly from those of other sex offender groups when undetected sex crimes were
included in the analysis." Langevin, supra, at 549. But see Roger Hood et al., Sex Offenders
Emerging from Long-Term Imprisonment, 42 BRIT.J. CRIMINOLOGY 371, 392 (2002) (concluding that
intrafamilial sex offenders are less likely than other sex offenders to be reconvicted of another
offense). Hood does acknowledge that this finding may be explained in part "due to the
difficulties of securing convictions rather than a decline in actual sexual reoffending." Id. This
would seem particularly likely in incest cases because of the difficulties involved in securing
convictions.
162. See Andrew, supra note 49, at 1873-74. To support this point, Andrew cites a position
paper by the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers that claims incestuous offenders
have fewer victims and have lower rates of recidivism than extrafamilial offenders. See id. at 1874
n.120 (citing Ass'n for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, Pedophiles and Child Molesters: The
Differences, available at http://atsa.com/ppPedophiles.html); see also David Greenburg et al.,
Recidivism of Child Molesters: A Study of Victim Relationship with the Perpetrator, 24 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 1485, 1490 tbl.3 (2000) (reporting the results of a Canadian study and concluding
that men who abused a biological child or stepchild were less likely to be charged with a new
criminal offense than men who abused an acquaintance or stranger). It is important to note,
however, that the study deliberately excluded offenders who offend across relationship
categories, see Greenburg et al., supra, at 1487, while the studies discussed below suggest these
crossoffenders constitute a significant percentage of parental offenders. See infra notes 164-66
and accompanying text. Further, the Greenburg study concluded that nineteen percent of
.pure" parental sex offenders were ultimately charged with a new criminal offense of some type.
Greenburg et al., supra, at 1490 tbl.3.
163. Goodwin, supra note 48, at 348 (quoting Deborah Johnson, Parents United Int'l).
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current evidence indicates that a substantial percentage of molesters offend
in both spheres."' 64 One recent study that looked at, inter alia, 104 incest
offenders found that two-thirds of the offenders in that group "'crossed
over' relationship categories," meaning they assaulted both victims who were
strangers and victims to whom they were in a "position of trust."' 65 Another
study of sixty-five fathers who had molested their biological children found
that one-third had molested outside the home, and eighty percent had
abused more than one victim.' 66 Thus, some research suggests that incest
offenders have the potential to reoffend and the potential to harm children
both in and outside their families.
The arguments in favor of disparate treatment also ignore the
particular harms associated with incest offenses. Parental incest, by
definition, is perpetrated by the very individual who is supposed to protect a
child from harm, not inflict it. Because of a parent's special position of
power over a child, parental abuse may inflict the most psychological
damage.16 Moreover, incest can often go on for years, as compared to an
undeniably horrific, but typically one-time, incident of abuse inflicted by a
stranger.' 68 Sexual abuse perpetrated by a family member is also less likely to
be discovered, meaning that many victims will suffer silently without ever
receiving therapeutic or law-enforcement resources to help redress the
wrongs they have suffered. 16"
164. Judith V. Becker, Offenders: Characteristics and Treatment, FUTURE CHILDREN, Summer-
Fall 1994, at 176, 177; see also NAT'L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, supra note 101, at
176 (citing Becker). Becker cites a study concluding that approximately forty-nine percent of
the 159 incest offenders interviewed had also been involved in "nonincest female pedophilia."
Becker, supra, at 180; see also Ian Barsetti et al., The Differentiation of Intrafamilial and Extrafamilial
Heterosexual Child Molesters, 13 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 275, 283 (1998) ("Intrafamilial and
extrafamilial child molesters showed very similar sexual interests .... .").
165. English et al., supra note 157, at 420; see also Peggy Heil et al., Crossover Sexual Offenses,
15 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 221, 232 (2003) ("[Sixty-four percent] of [the 223]
inmates [studied] known to victimize relative children also admitted victimizing nonrelative
children.").
166. See KC. Faller, Sexual Abuse by Paternal Caretakers: A Comparison of Abusers Who Are
Biological Fathers in Intact Families, Stepfathers, and Non-Custodial Fathers, in THE INCEST
PERPETRATOR: A FAMILY MEMBER NO ONE WANTS TO TREAT, supra note 157, at 67; see also Mark
R. Weinrott & Maureen Saylor, Self-Report of Crimes Committed by Sex Offenders, 6J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 286, 292 (1991) (finding that "9 of 18 known incest offenders admitted to
undetected abuse of a child outside the home," and "34% of the men known only to have
molested outside the home also perpetrated incest").
167. See generally ANN M. HARALAMBIE, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE IN CIVIL CASES 7 (1999)
(describing "many ways [in which] intrafamilial sexual abuse is more devastating to children
than molestation by a stranger").
168. See Corrigan, supra note 84, at 291; see also Zimring, supra note 8, at 533 ("The
tendency of family violence to represent a continuing threat to the victim's safety may justify
both more vigorous enforcement efforts and somewhat more serious sanctions than assaults
between strangers. ... ").
169. See, e.g., English et al., supra note 157, at 412 (citing one study that found that children
were 3.69 times more likely to disclose sex abuse when the abuse was perpetrated by a stranger
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Another reason for the disparity in treatment, although obviously not a
justification for it, is the fact that "[i]n the United States, cultural beliefs
about child sexual abuse appear to rest on a handful of persistent
stereotypes."' 7 0 Lynne Henderson makes a number of observations in this
regard. Perhaps the most dominant myth is that of the sexual-predator
stranger: the notion of "strangers in cars lurking around schoolyards." 17'
Other myths and stereotypes persist as well. For example, Henderson argues
that "[p]erhaps as part of a tendency to project a negative sexuality onto
others, members of the dominant culture may consider members of
,outsider' groups-gays and lesbians, Roman Catholic priests-to be likely
sexual abusers."' 72 She also suggests that we associate incest with "stereotypes
of Kentucky hill people and other marginal (and poor) groups." 171 As long
as we cling to the myth that sexual abuse is primarily perpetrated by
strangers and outsiders, why would legislators worry about whether parents
are receiving preferential treatment?
B. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM Is NOT THE MOST EFFECTIVE APPROACH
1. Breaking Up the Family Unit Should Be Avoided
Another set of justifications relates to concerns about the family unit
itself: incarcerating the offender breaks up a family, perhaps depriving it of
its primary breadwinner in the process. I would suggest that this kind of
justification is an example of the rose-colored view of parenthood I criticize,
where we persist in believing, for example, that a victim of incest is generally
rather than a family member and another that found that only two percent of incest crimes
were reported to authorities). Improving the protection of children through increased victim-
reporting rates is another important issue, but this is a complex and difficult question that is
beyond the scope of this Article.
170. Lynne Henderson, Without Narrative: Child Sexual Abuse, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 479,
490 (1997). Jon Conte suggests another reason behind "society's viewing [of] the incestuous
and nonincestuous offender in different terms." Conte, supra note 157, at 26. He points to
"[a]dult narcissism, which identifies with the adult rather than the child" and suggests that
"[m]any of us, when viewing the adult members of our families and communities who abuse
their own children, and noting the resemblance between those adults and ourselves, tend to
over identify with the offender and thereby minimize what they do." Id. at 27.
171. Henderson, supra note 170, at 490. This stereotype is hardly recent. Linda Gordon, for
example, argues:
Starting early in the twentieth century, incest was reinterpreted through a double
process of reconstituting the victim and the assailant. . . . The culprits were
redefined, first, as neglectful mothers, who failed to insulate their daughters from
sexual experience, and, second, as men-in-the-street, sexual deviants, or 'perverts,'
strangers to their victims. Both redefinitions served to withdraw scrutiny from
family relationships ....
LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OwN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY
VIOLENCE-BOSTON 1880-1960, at 215 (1988).
172. Henderson, supra note 170, at 490.
173. Id.
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better off remaining in an intact family unit with the offender still in the
home.
1 7 1
We need to unpack this objection a bit more-there are several
different lines of argument running through this particular issue. Perhaps
the most fundamental is the resistance to state interference in the private
realm of the family. As Katharine Bartlett has written, "We want a society in
which parents share the highest norms of what the parent-child relationship
should be, but we also want parents to be free to raise their children their
,175
own way." That is in part because if you are going to undertake the
enormously demanding job of parenthood, we believe that you should enjoy
some autonomy in the way you perform thatjob in return.1 76
It is unquestionably true that the state must and should refrain from
intervention in the family to some extent. Obviously, most Americans do not
want a world where the state intervenes in the marital bedroom to prohibit
certain decisions about contraceptive use or intervenes in the parent-child
relationship to prohibit certain kinds of decisions about schooling or what
language a family speaks at home. However, to borrow a phrase from
Elizabeth Schneider, who was speaking of the spousal relationship, "the
concept of freedom from state intrusion . . .takes on a different meaning
when it is violence" that goes on in the relationship.' 77 This Article is focused
on those cases where a parent intentionally murders or rapes a child. In
those scenarios, I believe that a parent has simply forfeited the right to
invoke the shield of family privacy against state intervention.
Even if the state should be able to interfere in the family under some
circumstances, perhaps the criminal justice system is simply the wrong
approach. Critics raise this particular argument with the most vigor in the
174. In her recent study of the incest exception in California, Ruby Andrew cites an article
from the Los Angeles Times that discusses the testimony of a psychologist before the California
legislature in 1981, when the legislature was considering revisiting the incest exception. See
Andrew, supra note 49, at 1878 n.136 (citing Jane Stevens, Ending An Awful Irony, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 2006, at B11). The article reports psychologist Hank Giarretto's testimony that
"lawmakers needed to be careful that the 'father offender' who 'had, usually, a very outstanding
career both in industry and in his place in the community,' was not mixed up 'with the type of
offender, the predator, the type of fellow who stalks his victims or who sets up situations
through which he can molest these children.'" Stevens, supra; see also Andrew, supra note 49, at
1878-79 ("Defenders [of the incest exception] encouraged the legislature to treat intrafamilial
child sexual abuse as a family dysfunction that could be resolved through therapy" and "urged
legislators to prioritize 'family reunification services.'" (internal footnotes omitted)).
175. Katharine Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 292, 297 (1988).
176. See Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2456 ("[Plarental authority and discretion are the
necessary quid pro quos for parents undertaking the responsibility of parenthood."). The Scotts
add that "[l]egal protection of parental rights and authority serves as an important form of
compensation for fulfillment of parental obligations and thus functions to serve the child's
interest in receiving good care from her parents." Id. at 2463.
177. Schneider, supra note 46, at 974; see also SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND
THE FAMILY 129 (1989) ("The privacy of home can be a dangerous place, especially for women
and children.").
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context of sexual abuse cases. For example, perhaps the criminal law is too
"blunt and adversarial" a system and "is poorly equipped to cope with the
social and psychological dimensions of child sexual abuse. """ Perhaps a
therapeutic approach, rather than a criminal one, would be more efficacious
in healing victims and keeping families together. Further, "the threat of
prosecution [might] cause abusive adults to hide their deviance rather than




To address this argument, it is necessary to consider the impact of the
criminal justice system on victims, on defendants, and on the family unit. In
terms of victims, it is certainly true that the criminal justice system has the
potential to inflict still more trauma on children who have been the victims
of sexual abuse. 80 Imagine how frightening it must be for a young child to
take the witness stand in front of a courtroom full of strangers and relate
painful details of abuse while the individual who inflicted that abuse is
watching. However, the answer to this problem is not to avoid the criminal
justice system entirely; the answer is to make the criminal justice system
more accommodating. There have already been tremendous strides in this
regard-many jurisdictions have created child-advocacy centers, for
example, that help prepare children for testimony and provide support and
counseling throughout the criminal justice process.'ls Further, concerns
about the traumatizing impact of courtroom testimony are a bit overblown
in light of the fact that the overwhelming majority of criminal cases are
resolved via a plea bargain rather than through a trial.
8 2
In terms of defendants, it seems highly unlikely that eliminating the
threat of criminal prosecution or mandatory reporting requirements would
suddenly induce incest offenders to rush into therapy on their own
. .. 183
initiative. Rather, the enforcement mechanisms available through the
criminal justice system have the potential to compel an offender to complete
a therapeutic treatment program.1 4 Another concern related to defendants
178. Myers, supra note 107, at 91. In his article, Myers summarizes the arguments of those
who criticize prosecution, rather than endorse them.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., Eli Newberger, Prosecution: A Problematic Approach to Child Abuse, 2 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 112, 116 (1987) (arguing that "[p]rosecution punishes the victim"
because the "courtroom process attaches evil, excitement, and mystery to forbidden sexual
acts").
181. For a discussion of child-advocacy centers, see generally Nancy Chandler, Children's
Advocacy Centers: Making a Difference One Child at a Time, 28 HAMLINEJ. PUB. L. & POL'Y 315
(2006).
182. See COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, ExAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2002, at 61
(Brian J. Ostrom et al. eds., 2003), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/DResearch/
csp/2002_.Files/2002_FullReport.pdf ("Approximately 3 percent of state criminal cases were
resolved by trial in 2001.").
183. See Myers, supra note 107, at 91.
184. See, e.g., James Peters, Janet Dinsmore & Patricia Toth, Why Prosecute Child Abuse?, 34
S.D. L. REv. 649, 654 (1989) ("[T]he court can order offenders into treatment programs in an
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is that criminal prosecution will have an unnecessarily stigmatizing effect
because "father offenders" typically are otherwise respected members of
their communities. 15 The simplest and most powerful response to this
argument is that offenders who abuse their own children deserve to be
stigmatized. We must acknowledge that because of parents' unique
responsibilities to care for and protect their children, victimizing their own
child makes their crime more blameworthy, rather than less so.
In terms of the family unit, critics of prosecution argue that use of the
criminal justice system can impose unjustified suffering on the offender's
family.' s6 For example, depriving a family of the primary breadwinner surely
can have devastating socioeconomic consequences. But this is true in every
criminal case. Every criminal defendant is someone's child or parent or
spouse or sibling. We typically do not allow the fact that a prison sentence
might deprive a family of its primary breadwinner to preclude prosecution
for a violent defendant who kills or rapes a stranger. Why should it suddenly
become a dispositive consideration in a case where a defendant inflicts the
same harm on a family member?
Two additional points bear mentioning. First, this Article is not
intended to suggest that families should always be permanently disrupted in
cases involving physical or sexual abuse. The question of whether family
preservation is an appropriate goal of child-protection efforts is a
tremendously complicated one. Child-welfare authorities must take a
hard, unbiased look at whether a child victim would be better off with the
offender in or out of the home and solicit the input of the child victim on
that issue. Second, it is critically important to recognize that greater use of
the criminal justice system cannot happen in a vacuum. As Elizabeth Pleck
has argued, "[C]riminalizing family violence can only go so far before the
family must be provided with other economic resources." 88 We must
recognize that society bears a collective responsibility to ensure that children
who have been the victims of physical or sexual abuse, and surviving siblings
attempt to modify deviant sexual interests or other abusive behavior and reduce the likelihood
of recidivism .... ").
185. See supra note 174 (describing the statement of psychologist Hank Giarretto).
186. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 22, at 341 (arguing that even in cases of physical abuse,
prosecution of parents is usually not appropriate because "[flines reduce limited family
financial abilities" and "[ilmprisonment separates parent and child"); Ann-Marie White, A New
Trend in Gun Control: Criminal Liability for the Negligent Storage of Firearms, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1389,
1423 (1993) (arguing that parents should not be imprisoned if a child dies due to parental
negligence because this "serves as a double penalty on the family").
* 187. For some sense of the debate over the question of family preservation, compare
BARTHOLET, supra note 30, at 7, decrying the "blood bias" that lies "at the core of current child
welfare policies," with DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATI'ERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE,
at viii (2002), decrying the "injustice of a system that separates thousands of Black children
from their parents every year and relegates them to damaging state institutions."
188. PLECK, supra note 24, at 203. Pleck further notes that "a policy against family violence
is only as far-reaching as the alternatives to the traditional family it makes available." Id.
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of a child who has been murdered by a parent, have a social and economic
"safety net" in the event the offender is incarcerated. I Families need access
to counseling, child care, health care, housing, and other community
resources in order to ensure that victims have the opportunity to reclaim
their lives.'90 Providing these resources will undoubtedly be expensive, but
the expense surely is worthwhile if we are serious about protecting our
children.
2. Increased Use of the Criminal Justice System Will Have a Disparate
Impact on the Poor and People of Color
The concern that greater use of the criminal justice system will have a
disparate impact on the poor and people of color is absolutely valid. We
must acknowledge and address the potential disparate impact of any
proposed reform on members of socioeconomically disadvantaged groups.
We have far too often "trampled on the domestic life of the poor" and
minority groups in our efforts to protect children.' 9' In the particular
scenario at the heart of this Article, we encounter the intersection of two
institutions with profound racial and class implications: the child-welfare
system and the criminal justice system.19 2 As Susan Brooks and Dorothy
Roberts have argued, "The child welfare system is marked by striking class
189. See Mary Becker, Double Binds Facing Mothers in Abusive Families: Social Support Systems,
Custody Outcomes, and Liability for Acts of Others, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 13, 31 (1995).
190. See id. at 31-32; see alsoJANE WALDFOGEL, THE FUTURE OF CHILD PROTECTION: HOW TO
BREAK THE CYCLE OF ABUSE AND NEGLECT 223-28 (1998) (describing how we must involve more
"community partners" in child-protection efforts).
191. PLECK, supra note 24, at 12. Pleck further notes that "assistance has also been
accompanied by efforts at social control and class domination." Id.
192. It is important to note that historically many elements of society tended to minimize
the importance of the parent-child relationship for Native-American and African-American
families. See, e.g., Annette Appell, Uneasy Tensions Between Children's Rights and Civil Rights, 5 NEV.
L.J. 141, 145 (2004) (describing how the family bonds of Native-American families "have been
subject to brutal disruption"); Marlee Kline, Race, Racism, and Feminist Legal Theory, in FEMINIST
LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 371, 375 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993) ("[T]he role of Black
women as mothers to their own children often goes unrecognized and is sometimes actively
ignored and discouraged."); Patricia Williams, On Being the Object of Property, in FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY: FOUNDATIONS, supra, at 594, 594, 598 (describing her family's personal experience
with children being separated from their parents).
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and race disparities.' ' 193 In addition, scholars have extensively documented
the racism that runs through the criminal justice system.194
An initial response is that we are already seeing rampant racism in the
criminal justice system in regard to these cases in a very different sense.
Remember those six or seven homicides in the District of Columbia every
year that I referenced at the start of the paper?' 9 These lost victims are no
doubt being ignored not only because they are child victims, but also
because many are victims of color.196 Indeed, the overwhelming majority of
the highly publicized cases in the past several years involved white victims:
Adam Walsh, Polly Klaas, JonBenet Ramsey, and Megan Kanka, to name just
a few. More vigorous prosecution of offenders who victimize their own
children will vindicate the rights of child victims of color whom society
currently overlooks.1
97
In addition, the possibility that more vigorous prosecution may have a
disparate impact on members of poor and minority groups does not mean
that we should not try in the first instance to hold parents more accountable;
it means, instead, that we must be vigilant to guard against racism and
classism in making legislative and law-enforcement decisions. We must
acknowledge and confront the reality that prosecutorial decision making,
for example, may "'reflect race, class, and gender biases of prosecutors who
have tended to be white, middle-class, and male.""198 Policymakers and law-
enforcement officers therefore should engage in critical self-analysis when
making legislative and law-enforcement determinations and consider
whether any of these biases are affecting their decision making. Nonetheless,
as long as the plight of children suffering from physical and sexual abuse
193. Susan Brooks & Dorothy Roberts, Family Court Reform, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 453, 453
(2002); see Annette Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race and Class on the
Child Protection System, 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 584 (1997) (arguing that "[t]he mothers and children
'served' by the public, [child] protective system are overwhelmingly poor and
disproportionately of color"); see also ROBERTS, supra note 187, at 10-25 (describing the
"system's inferior treatment of Black children"). Roberts argues that "Black children make up
nearly half of the national foster care population, even though they represent fewer than one-
fifth of the nation's children" and that "[p]overty-not the type or severity of maltreatment-is
the single most important predictor of placement in foster care." Id. at vi, 27.
194. See generally Dan M. Filler, Silence and the Racial Dimension of Megan's Law, 89 IOWA L.
REV. 1535 (2004); Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27
(1984).
195. See supra text accompanying note 5.
196. See, e.g., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2004, supra note 155, at 66. For child fatalities in 2004,
43.2% were white, 27.2% were African-American, 18.6% were Hispanic, and 4.8% were
American Indian, Alaska Native, Asian, Pacific Islander, "other," or mixed-race. Id.
197. See Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107
HARv. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (1994) ("[T]he main problem confronting black communities in the
United States is not excessive policing and invidious punishment but rather a failure of the state
to provide black communities with the equal protection of the laws.").
198. Murphy, supra note 40, at 719 (quoting Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A
Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 TEX.J. WOMEN & L. 75, 98-99 (1993)).
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continues, we must try to use available resources to protect them from harm
and condemn those who harm them when prevention efforts fail.
V. GOING FORWARD
How can we better protect our children in the future? As an initial
matter, there are concrete legislative steps we could take to vastly improve
the lives of many children. More fundamentally, we need to reorient our
thinking toward the home if we truly want to protect our children from
harm. Love is simply not enough to protect our children; the law must also
play a role.
A. LEGISLATIVE REFORMS
One obvious fix is to eliminate the incest loopholes that pervade so
many state statutory schemes.' 99 Offenders who victimize child relatives
should not receive preferential treatment as compared to offenders who
victimize acquaintances or strangers. New York, North Carolina, Illinois, and
California recently eliminated these loopholes. 2"° To fix this problem, states
could take several different approaches. For example, North Carolina
changed incest from a Class F felony to a Class BI felony.2' Illinois's new law
eliminates the possibility of probation for sexual assault offenses, regardless
of the relationship between the defendant and his victim. 202 While
completely eliminating the possibility of probation for any sex offense may
go too far, the general idea makes sense: parents should not receive a
sentencing discount for intentionally committing a physical or sexual assault
against a child solely because of their status as parents. Instead,
considerations such as the offender's prior record and the extent to which
the assault was violent should drive the sentencing decision-considerations
that would be applicable across all classes of cases.
Here is a far more radical reform proposal: I would endorse a statute
forbidding parents to use corporal punishment against their children
because I believe that our continued acceptance of this practice contributes
to the more serious forms of violence perpetrated against children that are
at the heart of this Article. 20' To be sure, I recognize that this proposed
199. See supra notes 49-80 and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing the elimination of the
loophole in New York).
201. See Act of Sept. 23, 2002, No. 119, 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws 280 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 14-178,-179 (2005)).
202. See Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n to Protect Children, Illinois to Eliminate Child Sexual
Abuse Loophole (May 30, 2003), availabe at http://www.protect.org/articles/illinois.shtml.
203. See MYERS, supra note 22, at 147 ("The problem with corporal punishment is that
tolerating the practice at all guarantees that some adults will misuse it, maiming and killing
children. Corporal punishment is a major contributor to child abuse."). Indeed, perhaps this
proposal is becoming more mainstream: a state legislator in California recently introduced a
bill banning the spanking of children under the age of three. See, e.g., Ilene Lelchuk, Bid to
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principle will be tremendously controversial, especially in light of the fact
that approximately ninety percent of Americans continue to spank their
children despite the prevalence of research opposed to the practice.0 4
However, it is hardly a novel proposal; at least twelve other countries have
outlawed all use of corporal punishment against children, including Great
Britain, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Germany, and Italy.
20 5
Of course, prosecutors' offices do not have the resources to prosecute
every parent who spanks a toddler, just as they do not prosecute all minor
assaults committed against adults. 2 0 6 In Sweden, for example, the
government prosecutes parents "only in cases that [otherwise] meet the
criteria of assault"; the law that forbade the use of corporal punishment
201contained no independent criminal penalties. If we make a clear legal
statement that spanking is illegal, presumably many parents will conform to
the law and stop spanking. Such a rule will also make prosecution decisions
simpler in cases where serious physical injury does result.20 8 Now,
prosecutors have to try to parse out acceptable motives for the use of
corporal punishment from the unacceptable ones and determine whether
the parent really was engaged in discipline or just offering a post hoc
rationalization to justify abusive conduct that in fact arose out of rage or
some other motivation.
The most important reason for prohibiting the use of force against
children is to change our cultural mindset. We live in a country where
hitting children continues to be a "'normal' part of child-rearing."20 9
Contrast our beliefs in this regard to our current beliefs regarding the
physical abuse of women, where hitting is no longer considered an
Outlaw Spanking Stirs Emotions: Mountain View Lawmaker's Plan Faces an Uphill Fight, S.F. CHRON.,
Jan. 30, 2007, at Al.
204. See Pollard, supra note 128, at 577 (discussing the prevalence of spanking in the
American childrearing process).
205. See id. at 587. Pollard reports that "Finland, Norway, Austria, Cyprus, Italy, Croatia,
Latvia, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Israel, and Germany" have all banned spanking
completely and a number of other countries have legislation pending, including "Switzerland,
Poland, Spain, Scotland, Canada, Jamaica, New Zealand, Namibia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the
Republic of Ireland, and Belgium." Id.
206. See id. at 591 (citing a statement by the National Children's Bureau in Great Britain
after ajudicial decision barring parental corporal punishment).
207. Joan Durrant, The Swedish Ban on Corporal Punishment: Its History and Effects, in FAMILY
VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 19, 21 (Detlev Frehsee, Wiebke Horn & Kai-D. Bussman eds.,
1996). Durrant further argues that "[t]he law was intended as a guideline for parents to follow
and as a means of changing attitudes towards the use of force in childrearing." Id. at 21-22.
208. See PLECK, supra note 24, at 76-77 ("The perennial difficulty for reformers against
child abuse lies in drawing the line between legitimate corporal punishment and child
cruelty."). Ending the legitimacy of corporal punishment helps eliminate this problem.
209. Pollard, supra note 128, at 577; see also David Orentlicher, Spanking and Other Corporal
Punishment of Children by Parents: Overvaluing Pain, Undervaluing Children, 35 HOuS. L. REV. 147,
149 (1998) (arguing that our continuing "tolerance of corporal punishment" leads us to
"undervalue children").
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acceptable component of a romantic relationship. I am not suggesting that
battering of women is no longer a problem; of course battering of romantic
partners continues in this country at profoundly troubling rates, and our
legal institutions still have much work to do. t0 In general, though, our
culture now considers a slap across the face or repeated swats to the backside
completely unacceptable conduct, grounds for divorce, and so on, if
perpetrated by a man against a woman. 1 l Precisely the same conduct is still
considered acceptable if perpetrated by a parent against a child, even
though children are, unlike adults, utterly without resources to defend
themselves or escape from the situation. Violence begets violence, and
212spanking often escalates to more serious child abuse. A clear legal
statement that it is unacceptable to use physical force against children will
be an important first step in better protecting them.
One possible rejoinder here is the argument that children are, in fact,
different from adults and, therefore, entitled to less protection. There are
many things we allow adults to do to children in the name of discipline that
they do not do to other adults-put children in a "time-out," for example, or
take away a favorite toy.2 11 Parents unquestionably have the right to use
discipline to try to guide their children to a responsible and productive
214
adulthood. In light of the well-documented harms caused by spanking,
however, that right should not encompass the right to use physical force.
Indeed, many of the justifications we hear to rationalize spanking children-
to teach children to defer to their "superiors" (their parents) or to punish
them for failing to fulfill their obligations or for engaging in "inappropriate
behavior"-are eerily reminiscent of the justifications we used to hear to
215rationalize physical abuse against women.
210. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER INEQUALITY 108
(1997) ("[Dlespite recent improvements, the individuals most responsible for the persistence
of domestic violence-batterers and law enforcement officials-still tend to minimize its
significance, blame victims for its frequency, and discount their role in its solution.").
211. See generally GORDON, supra note 171, at 251 (noting that "[w]ife-beating is now not
only illegal but also, to a majority of Americans, shameful").
212. See Pollard, supra note 128, at 621-22 (describing research showing that "spanking is a
precursor to child abuse").
213. Of course, imprisonment by the state can be viewed as the ultimate "time-out."
214. See Pollard, supra note 128, at 601-27 (documenting the harms caused by spanking,
including the developmental and psychological damage it does to children, and describing
research showing that physical punishment is not an effective form of discipline). For other
discussions of some of the harmful consequences to children associated with corporal
punishment, see PHILIP GREVEN, SPARE THE CHILD: THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF PUNISHMENT AND
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF PHYSICAL ABUSE 122-212 (1990), and MURRAY STRAUS, BEATING
THE DEVIL OUT OF THEM: CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN FAMILIES AND ITS EFFECTS ON
CHILDREN 67-146 (2001). Straus also argues that we must view the hitting of children and the
hitting of wives as equivalent problems. See STRAUS, supra, at xvii-xx.
215. See GORDON, supra note 171, at 250-88 (explaining how male violence was an
.assertion of dominance" and that wife-beaters were "[a]ccustomed to supremacy, [and]
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Another potential criticism of my proposal is that it is in a sense
antidemocratic: we should not use the law as a blunt instrument to prohibit
conduct that a majority of Americans still believes to be acceptable. This
criticism has power; it is important to recognize that police and prosecutors
could underenforce a truly unpopular law and that citizens could reject the
• • • 216
law in criminal cases through acts ofjury nullification. In a practical sense,
I am hopeful that such a law could actually pass and be workable. Even
though most people spank, I think most legislators and law-enforcement
officials would ultimately acknowledge that it would be better not to spank,
especially if confronted with all the expert evidence detailing the harms of
corporal punishment.17 In a more theoretical sense, I believe this is simply
one of those times where the criminal law needs to be aspirational.
B. A THEORETICAL REORIENTA TION
1. A Reorientation Toward the Home
Although America is obsessed with protecting our children, we persist
in viewing "stranger danger" as the greatest threat to their well-being. In
absolute terms, of course, this perception is entirely inaccurate. As described
above in Part III.A.3, children face a far greater risk of death at the hands of
their parents than at the hands of a stranger.21 s If we are serious about
reducing the risks children face, we simply must turn our attention to how
best to minimize the dangers they face at home.
Our obsession with stranger danger has another troubling implication.
By suggesting that strangers pose the greatest danger to our children, we
acculturated to expect service and deference from women"); see also MYERS, supra note 22, at
167 ("If you are among the majority of Americans who believe hitting children is necessary for
discipline, keep in mind that not so long ago some men thought it necessary to hit women for
discipline."). Myers makes powerful arguments in favor of outlawing corporal punishment that
are well worth reading. See id. at 166-69.
216. See generally Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norns Problem, 67
U. CHI. L. REv. 607, 607 (2000) ("[A]s legislators expand liability for date rape, domestic
violence, and drunk driving, police become less likely to arrest, prosecutors to charge,jurors to
convict, and judges to sentence severely.").
217. Although a full discussion of the best form of such legislation is beyond the scope of
this Article, there are ways the legislation could be drafted that might increase its viability.
Although I would strongly support outlawing any form of corporal punishment, if an
incremental approach would be viewed as preferable, perhaps force above and beyond an open-
handed slap could be prohibited as a first step. That would allow for the kind of traditional
spanking that most parents consider acceptable; presumably, many parents, even those in favor
of corporal punishment, would draw the line at hitting their children with an object or
punching and kicking them. I am indebted to Carissa Hessick and Kay Levine for their very
helpful insights on this section of the Article.
218. See alsoJENKINS, supra note 4, at 10. Jenkins argues that between 1980 and 1994, only
six percent of the children under the age of twelve who were murdered in the United States
were murdered by a stranger. Only three percent of the crimes involved a murder coupled with
a sex offense.
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minimize the harms that are inflicted when children are victimized by
someone they love. Carissa Hessick makes some powerful observations in
this regard. First, victims of family violence may be more "likely to feel guilt
or confusion about the violent incident" than victims of stranger violence."9
Although Hessick focuses here on adult rather than child victims, this
possibility applies with equal force in the context of children. In attempting
to overcome the trauma that they have endured, child victims of physical or
sexual abuse often have to cope with the feeling that perhaps they
"deserved" the abuse."0 "[A]buse may teach the child that he or she is
helpless (i.e., to avoid the abuse), inadequate (i.e., to mount a successful
defense), and loathsome (i.e., to deserve such maltreatment) - lessons the
individual will continue to apply later in life."2 2' Certainly victims of stranger
violence may have some of the same reactions, but the fact that the abuse is
inflicted by a caretaker, the very person who is supposed to ensure a child's
safety, makes the abuse particularly traumatic.
Further, in situations where parents intentionally harm their children,
we must recognize that the existence of the parental relationship makes the
conduct more blameworthy, rather than less so.223 We have multiple
obligations to our children that simply do not extend to strangers or
acquaintances-in the most basic terms, to provide them with food, shelter,
and clothing and to protect them to the extent we can from the harms the
224
world may impose. When we afflict affirmative harm on a member of that
very small class of individuals whom we have an affirmative obligation to
protect, the betrayal of trust is especially reprehensible. In cases of
intentional harm like murder and rape, we should consider the existence of
a parental relationship an aggravating factor rather than a mitigating one.
219. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Violence Between Lovers, Strangers, and Friends, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 57, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-984307).
220. See Mark Chaffin et al., Treating Abused Adolescents, in THE APSAC HANDBOOK ON CHILD
MALTREATMENT 119, 124-25, 133 (1996) (discussing the "social stressor that may arise from the
tendency for many adolescents to be exquisitely sensitive to the possibility that peers and
schoolmates might discover the abuse and view them as responsible, disgraced, and
stigmatized").
221. John Briere, A Self-Trauma Model for Treating Adult Survivors of Severe Child Abuse, in THE
APSAC HANDBOOK ON CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 220, at 140, 143.
222. See Jacqui Hetherton, The Idealization of Women: Its Role in the Minimization of Child
Sexual Abuse by Females, 23 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 161, 167 (1999) ("Degree of closeness
between the victim and perpetrators and thus heightened sense of betrayal, is widely reported
as predictive of increased trauma." (citation omitted)).
223. SeeHessick, supra note 219 (manuscript at 58) ("[V]iolent crimes that occur within the
context of close personal relationships may involve a breach of trust and feelings of betrayal
that would not arise had the same crime been committed by a stranger.").
224. See, e.g., David A. Hyman, Rescue Without Law: An Empirical Perspective on the Duty to
Rescue, 84 TEX. L. REV. 653, 655 (2006) ("Absent a limited number of specific exceptions, there
is no duty to rescue .... ").
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2. The Charging Versus Sentencing Distinction
An additional way in which we must reorient our thinking is to move
away from the presumption that prosecution inevitably leads to
incarceration and that therefore we must avoid prosecution in the first
instance to ensure that parents who beat their children are not filling the
nation's jails. Let us assume for a moment that a reader of this Article is
persuaded that perhaps the criminal law currently is treating parents too
generously but still believes that we must give the existence of a parent-child
relationship some consideration when police, prosecutors, and judges
evaluate cases. If that is true, I believe such considerations are more
appropriately taken into account at the time of sentencing, rather than at
the point in the process where the state makes the decision about whether to
file charges at all.
2 5
There are a multitude of factors that we take into account at the time of
sentencing that ordinarily do not preclude a decision to charge the offender
in the first instance. The seriousness of a defendant's criminal record is one
example; we would not decline to charge a violent robber on the ground
that it was his first offense, but the absence of a criminal record might well
result in a lesser sentence. Remorse over committing the crime is another
example; a judge might well consider the fact that a defendant truly regrets
committing a crime when deciding whether to impose the maximum
sentence, but a prosecutor probably would not when making the charging
decision.
That is because sentencing offers us the most appropriate opportunity
to incorporate the important values of compassion, forgiveness, and mercy
into the criminal justice system. Take the example of a defendant who has
raped his young daughter on multiple occasions, rather than selecting a
stranger as his victim. Why should the fact of that relationship be taken into
account, if at all, at the time of sentencing rather than the time of charging?
In practical terms, much more is known about the defendant's background,
the family's situation, and the circumstances of the crime at the time of
sentencing. In moral terms, choosing to charge the defendant makes the
normative statements that the defendant has engaged in conduct worthy of
societal condemnation and that protecting a child relative is just as
important as protecting a child who is a stranger to his or her attacker.
C. THE QUESTION OFMOTHERHOOD
As referenced above, it is impossible to discuss parental violence
without giving some special attention to the question of motherhood, for a
number of reasons. Greater use of the criminal justice system to protect
children will undoubtedly have a disparate impact on women. If
225. I discussed the charging-versus-sentencing distinction more extensively in a prior
article. See Collins, supra note 121, at 849-52.
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prosecutions increase, women are more likely than men to bear the brunt of
that change simply by virtue of the fact that they are more often the
custodial parent.2 2 6 Further, women are typically-and regrettably-held to a
higher standard of care in regard to childrearing than men, and prosecutors
may accordingly act more aggressively against mothers because of their own
227biases about mothering.
The prevalence of violence against children has always posed "a
problem for feminist theory."2 8 This is, in part, because "[d]efending
women against violence is so urgent that we fear women's loss of status as
political, deserving, 'victims' if we acknowledge women's own aggressions. ",22 9
Some feminist scholars have, of course, addressed the issue of child abuse,
but many of these terrific articles follow a similar pattern: they begin by
acknowledging the difficulties child abuse poses for feminists but then limit
their discussion of those difficulties to cases in which the mother is also
being battered herself.
23 °
There are really two separate issues here. The first is the issue upon
which feminist scholars have focused: what do we do about cases of child
226. See, e.g., Nancy Erickson, Battered Mothers of Battered Children: Using Our Knowledge of
Battered Women to Defend Them Against Charges of Failure to Act, in IA CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,
ABUSE AND ENDANGERMENT 197, 199 (Sandra Anderson Garcia & Robert Batey eds., 1991)
("[B]ased on sheer numbers alone, one could predict that women will be prosecuted for this
category of failure to act more frequently than men.").
227. One commentator has argued that "society particularly expects that the mother will be
the child's protector" and that "[t]he mother is expected to suppress any individual identity or
needs of her own in order to serve and protect the needs of her child." Michelle Jacobs,
Requiring Battered Women Die: Murder Liability for Mothers Under Failure to Protect Statutes, 88J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 579, 587 (1998); see also Becker, supra note 189, at 15 ("There is a profound
tendency in our culture to blame mothers (not fathers) for all problems children face (and all
problem children)."). Elizabeth Rapaport wrote a fascinating article about motherhood and
infanticide, arguing that both the media and legal scholarship "amplify the role of women and
mute the role of men," in part because we are "beguiled" by "the mad women and desperate
girl stereotypes." Elizabeth Rapaport, Mad Women and Desperate Girls: Infanticide and Child Murder
in Law and Myth, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 529 (2006).
228. See Ashe & Cahn, supra note 198, at 75; see also WILCZYNSKI, supra note 114, at 12
("[F]eminist authors have on the whole largely side-stepped the issue of women's violence
towards their children . . . ."); Becker, supra note 189, at 13 ("Child abuse is an awkward topic
for feminists and feminism."). Becker further notes that "one general problem child abuse
poses for feminism is that all strands of feminism tend to focus on women and their needs
under the current social and legal order, rather than on women as beings who abuse power and
fail to protect their children." Id. at 14.
229. Linda Gordon, Feminism and Social Control: The Case of Child Abuse and Neglect, in WHAT
Is FEMINISM? 63, 68 (Juliet Mitchell & Ann Oakley eds., 1986). For an illustration of the
practical impact of this phenomenon, see Hetherton, supra note 222, at 164, describing the
angry response of some feminist groups to the first conference on female sexual abusers.
Hetherton suggests that "the official line from many feminist organizations was that to address
the issue [of sexual abuse perpetrated by women] at all was to draw attention away from the fact
that child sexual abuse is about the exercise of male power." Id.
230. For examples of this phenomenon, see Ashe & Cahn, supra note 198, at 87-90; Becker,
supra note 189, at 31; Dohrn, supra note 10, at 3-4; and Murphy, supra note 40, at 745.
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physical or sexual abuse that occur in families where the mother is also
being abused? The second and overlooked issue is the more difficult: what
do we do about cases in which children are abused but the mother is not
herself a victim of abuse? Should the status of motherhood make a
difference in those cases as well?
Let us begin with the first scenario. There are two different potential
bases of liability for mothers: the first is when the mother herself
affirmatively inflicts physical or sexual injury on the child; the second is
when the state charges the mother not because she personally inflicted any
injury, but because she failed to protect the child from being abused by
someone else, most typically her male partner. The fact that a mother is
suffering from abuse is most clearly relevant in the failure-to-protect cases.
The fact that a mother is charged at all in the failure-to-protect scenario
is a powerful example of the "mother-blaming" bias that permeates not only
our legal institutions, but also our cultural norms about parenting that I
discussed in the first Part of this Article. "[M]others are expected to be
much better and more powerful parents than fathers, always putting their
children's needs above their own and protecting their children from all
harm."23 1 Those expectations obviously are particularly difficult to fulfill in
cases where both mother and children are being battered because there may
be few available options open to these women to help them remove their
children from the abusive situation. They may correctly perceive that
232attempts to leave will escalate the violence. They may have no economic
options in terms of being able to find housing or a job that will provide
sufficient income to support a family.
2 3 3
Therefore, we must partner any attempts to hold mothers accountable
for their failure to protect with efforts to make it more viable for women to
leave abusive partners-for example, by providing more funding for
shelters, job training, and child-care resources. 234 It is simply unrealistic to
demand that a woman leave her home to protect her children if she knows
that leaving will result in homelessness, hunger, or increased violence. That
231. Becker, supra note 189, at 15; see alsoJANE SWIGART, THE MYrH OF THE BAD MOTHER:
THE EMOTIONAL REALITIES OF MOTHERING 6 (1991) ("[W]e live in a society that simultaneously
idealizes and devalues the mother."); Naomi Cahn, Policing Women: Moral Arguments and the
Dilemmas of Criminalization, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 817, 822 (2000) ("Cultural middle-class norms
expect all women to be primarily responsible for their children. The criminal justice system
supports this norm by criminalizing the abusive and neglectful behavior of parents, penalizing
mothers particularly harshly.").
232. See Becker, supra note 189, at 19 (noting that women are sometimes murdered after
leaving an abusive spouse).
233. See id.
234. See id. at 31-32 (urging the provision of stronger "safety nets" for women in abusive
situations); see also Gordon, supra note 229, at 69 ("Good social policy could address the
problem of wife beating in part by empowering women to leave abusive situations, enabling
them to live in comfort and dignity without men .... ").
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being said, however, even women who are themselves the victims of abuse
should face some consequence if their failure to protect results in the death
of, or serious injury to, their children. Young children are simply helpless to
protect themselves from harm; that responsibility must fall on the shoulders
of those adults in the position to be a child's only lifeline.23 5
There should be some limitations to liability, however. First, we should
limit liability to those circumstances where a parent had prior knowledge of
past abuse and had the practical opportunity to seek help, such as access to a
telephone to contact law-enforcement authorities. Second, in many
instances, parents who fail to protect in a case involving a fatality should not
face the same homicide charge as the actual killer but, instead, should be
charged under a separate statutory scheme criminalizing a failure to protect
and carrying lesser penalties.2 6 A separate statutory scheme would better
reflect that there is a meaningful moral distinction between actually
inflicting the fatal blows and, for example, making the mistake of leaving a
child alone with an individual who has been abusive in the past. Finally, a
woman's history of being abused should certainly be a relevant
consideration for ajudge at the time of sentencing.
What about cases in which the mother is being battered and she is also
affirmatively battering her children? Should she escape liability by virtue of
her own abuse? One commentator, for example, has argued that "if the
woman can show that the gendered nature of her oppression helped to
construct her criminal behavior, then that oppression should act as a
,,211
mitigating factor to reduce her crime. She further suggests that a woman
who "abused her child in response to her abuse" should be entitled to a
"provocation justification" type of defense and should be convicted of a
crime other than child abuse, such as "assault by socially justifiable
provocation. 2 3 8 Finally, the punishment for a conviction on such an assault
charge should consist of forced rehabilitative therapy rather than
• • .239
imprisonment.
These suggestions are problematic for a number of reasons. First, the
sentencing suggestion makes no reference to the idea that the severity of any
sentence imposed should vary, at least in part, according to the severity of
the abuse inflicted. Surely imprisonment should at least be considered for a
235. As Mary Becker has written, "[T]he assumption should be that the adult who was not
literally a hostage-not literally coerced at every available second-could have acted to end
abuse," at least by picking up the phone and calling 911. Becker, supra note 189, at 21. Becker
adds, "No matter how weak the mother, she is in a much better position than the child to
prevent abuse and owes a duty of care to her children." Id.
236. I say "in many instances" because presumably there may be some cases where the more
passive parent is just as culpable as the actual abuser by providing active encouragement or a
weapon or the like.
237. Plank, supra note 8, at 107-08.
238. Id. at 108-09.
239. See id. at 110.
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mother whose act of battery left a child permanently brain damaged or
paralyzed, for example. The mother's own abuse simply cannot be the only
factor in the sentencing calculus; it is instead one of many relevant factors.
In addition, taken to its logical extension, the idea that abuse occurring in
response to past abuse is less blameworthy could also be extended to men
who claim justification for abusing their wives by pointing to their own
childhood experiences of abuse, either as a recipient or an observer. The
idea that we should allow men who are battering their wives to claim their
assaults were "socially justified" is profoundly troubling, and it would have
the potential to undercut years of progress on the issue of domestic violence.
So what should we do when a battered woman herself batters a child?
The fact of the battering surely needs to be taken into account at the time of
sentencing. However, it should not preclude the decision to charge in the
first instance-charging makes the normative statement that battering a
child is unacceptable no matter what the circumstances and that protecting
children from physical harm is one of the core values of our criminal justice
system. Adjusting the sentence in light of the battering reflects our
compassion and potentially opens the door to some creative sentencing
options.24 °
The same general ideas hold true in those forty to sixty percent of child
abuse cases where there is no evidence that the woman is being abused and
yet she is abusing her own children. First, any assertion that the offender is
not being abused should not automatically be taken at face value. Lawyers
and law-enforcement officers should try to understand the realities of the
lives of women they encounter through their work in the criminal justice
system and be sensitive to the possibility that sometimes abuse is deeply
hidden from public view.14 But what about the scenario where there is no
abuse? Should the fact of the offender's motherhood still be relevant? I
suggest that the offender's status as a parent is relevant, but we must be
vigilant to ensure that mothers are not held to a higher standard or
penalized more harshly than fathers. The fact that it is a parent who has
physically or sexually abused a child indeed makes the conduct more
blameworthy, rather than less, because of the parent's special position of
trust and responsibility. However, the fact that it is a mother rather than a
father who is committing the abuse should not matter-treating mothers as
more culpable than fathers contributes to the problems of idealizing
240. For example, although this is a complex issue, as part of her sentence perhaps the
female offender could be ordered to stay away from her own batterer, thereby providing her a
legally sanctioned excuse to exit. This option is only viable to the extent we are committed as a
society to providing more resources to support women who are leaving abusive situations.
241. See generally Marie Ashe, Postmodernism, Legal Ethics, and Representation of "Bad Mothers,"
in MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD 142, 152-
53 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995) (discussing how the "underlying
realities of mothers' lives" sometimes remain deeply "private" and "hidden").
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motherhood and reducing women to nothing more than their socially
constructed role as mothers.42
We must acknowledge that female perpetrators do exist and hold them
accountable when they inflict harm on their children. To deny women's
agency in this context, to view them always as passive and innocent actors in
the culture of violence that surrounds some of our children, is "sexist, not
feminist."2 43 Failing to hold those women who abuse children accountable,
even though not suffering from abuse themselves, "subordinat[es] the
interests of children to those of women," thereby putting children at risk of
further abuse and leaving them utterly alone.244 That is not to say that issues
of class, poverty, and gender bias do not contribute to the problem of child
abuse; of course they do, and we must address those issues.245 But we must
draw a bright line around the idea that child homicide and child rape can
never be acceptable, even though we might be able to trace the genesis of
the offender's criminal conduct to her own experiences with oppression or
violence. Acknowledging the fact that some women are themselves
aggressors should not undermine their deserving status as victims in so many
other contexts; it simply reflects the wider reality of women's experiences.
V. CONCLUSION
It is certainly true that awareness of and concern about the physical and
sexual maltreatment of children is increasing in this country, but this Article
suggests that our concerns about that maltreatment are largely misguided.
Instead of focusing on the place where children face the most danger, the
home, we have directed our concerns outward and focused on the notion of
stranger danger. If we are serious about protecting children, we must
reorient our thinking toward the home and explore new options to hold the
offenders accountable who victimize our children. We must also reorient
our thinking away from our idealized notion of the parent-child
relationship: our belief that parents will do right by their children without
the intervention of the criminal law. As the statistics discussed in this Article
demonstrate, parental love is always not enough to protect our children
from violence.
242. See Ashe & Cahn, supra note 198, at 86 ("Popular simplistic and reductive
interpretations of abusive mothers may constitute attempts by parents to drive away a
recognition of their own tendencies toward verbal and physical violence against children.").
243. Kay L. Levine, No Penis, No Problem, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 357, 385 n.125 (2006). See
generally Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women's Lives, Violence, and Agency, in
THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE, supra note 24, at 59, 64 (discussing how it is "so
difficult" for us "to see both agency and oppression in the lives of women").
244. Levine, supra note 243, at 385 n.125.
245. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 8, at 185 (noting the tendency of "public debate" to
"ignore[] or understate[] the evidence suggesting a correlation between abuse and neglect on
the one hand and poverty on the other").
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In many ways, the reorientation urged by this Article parallels the
developments that have already taken place in the fight against violence
directed at women. Activists, in large part, successfully have convinced law
enforcement in particular and society in general that wife abuse and marital
rape are examples of criminal conduct that demand redress through the
246
criminal justice system. When it comes to the battering and rape of
children, however, we persist in viewing that conduct as exemplifying mental
illness that requires "social services and psychological treatment," rather
247than legal sanctions. Social services and psychological treatment may well
play an important role in healing victims, offenders, and their families, but
the criminal justice system must play an important role, too. We will not
make meaningful progress against the problems of the physical and sexual
abuse of children until we begin to view parental battering as criminal
conduct that requires some legal sanction by the state in order to fully
validate the lives of our youngest and most vulnerable victims.
246. See Pleck, supra note 36, at 49-50 (documenting reforms against family violence
throughout American history); see also Corrigan, supra note 84, at 271 (describing the efforts of
feminists to "counter pervasive assumptions that rape was the product of a diseased mind").
247. Pleck, supra note 36, at 49-50.
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